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Abstract
Resource transfers among households have received considerable interest among
economists in recent years.  Two of the main reasons for the surge of interest in household
transfers are the information on human nature conveyed by transfer behavior and the implication
on income redistribution policy that private transfer might have.  Empirical studies, however,
provide mixed results on transfer behavior.  This is because previous inquiries were confronted
with several estimation issues and have focused on data from developed countries where private
transfers are already small.  This paper contributes to the literature on transfer behavior by using
a multifaceted econometric approach to examine the motives of household transfers in Burkina, a
low-income country with a well-documented tradition of gift exchanges.  The findings suggest
that risk sharing is not central to transfers.  Altruistic transfers are apparent for the middle
income class, but not a low income level.  The evidence implies that crowding out may be
minimal at a low income level, suggesting that public transfers targeting poor households may be
effective.
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1 Introduction
Following the pioneering work of Becker (1974) and Cox (1987), economists have paid growing
attention to the importance and the motives of private transfers among households1. Three main
theoretical hypotheses have been advanced to explain such transfers. First, according to the al-
truistic model, donors care for the well-being of recipients, and transfers depend on the ¯nancial
situation of both the donor and the recipient(Becker, 1974). Second, under exchange motive,
transfers are rooted in a reciprocity structure, and they may be seen as the counterpart of previous
transfers (Cox, 1987; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001). Third, under mutual insurance, households
enter into mutual agreements, and transfers of transitory income are used to smooth consumption
(e.g. Townsend, 1994). In addition to conveying useful information on human behavior, knowing
the underlying motive of these transfers has strong policy implications on the e®ectiveness of public
transfers2. The main policy concern is that compensatory reductions in private transfers, if large
enough, may e®ectively neutralize the e®ects of public transfers (Barro, 1974; Becker, 1974).
This paper explores the motives for inter-household private transfers in Burkina Faso, a low-
income country in the Sahel region of West Africa3. Arguably, Burkina o®ers an interesting setting
for examining transfer response to income. Formal transfers are very limited, and private transfers
are believed to be important. About 90 percent of the population lives in rural areas, and virtually
all rural population depends on rainfed agriculture as the basis for their livelihoods. Presumably,
rainfall variability in conjunction with very low income levels create a pressing need for insurance,
which in absence of formal markets is met with informal arrangements4. Gift exchanges are believed
to be a central element of these social arrangements (e.g. Shipton, 1990). The central role occupied
by gift exchanges in Burkina is well documented through anthropological and sociological literature
(e.g. Fiske, 1990; Hammond, 1966; Saul, 1981, 1983). This strand of work portrays a complex gift
exchange system which involves relatives and friends, and encompasses what may be viewed as
exchange, altruistic, and insurance motivated transfers5. Furthermore, social norms prescribe the
1See Varet-Gerard, Kolm, and Ythier (2000) for a recent review.
2For example, while public transfers are crowded out by altruistically motivated transfers, Cox and Jakubson
(1995) found that an extent of public transfers may increase the amount of ¯nancial transfers received under exchange.
Ignoring risk sharing pattern within the kinship network has dampened the e®ectiveness of a response to famine in
southern Sudan (Harragin, 2004).
3For example, income per capita per year is estimated at $ 220 (or $ 0.60 a day, far below the conventional measure
of $ 1 a day adopted for global poverty measure), life expectancy at birth is estimated at 42.9 years, and under ¯ve
mortality is estimated a 207 per 1000. See http://www.worldbank.org/afr/bf for more details.
4For a characterization of rainfall variability in the region, see Nicholson and Paolo (1993).
5Hammond (1966, p. 99-100)'s illustration of gift exchanges between two brothers gives a °avor of the °ow and
the widespread of transfers in the region.
\When a Moose man gives several bundles of millet to his younger brother whose harvest were damaged
by an invasion of migratory locusts, he does not expect and perhaps will not receive a return gift of an
equal amount of grain.
But he has a right to expect, and will receive something, or some things of approximately equal value-
a goat, help in repairing the roof of his granary, perhaps over a period of several months a variety of3
provision of support to the elderly (e.g. Badini, 2004) and to the less fortunate kinship members (e.g.
Riesman, 1974), which in practice leads to altruistic transfers6. In earlier data collection e®orts,
Ancey (1983) found that for 22 percent of migrants the most important fraction of migration
costs were paid by transfers from relatives, suggesting that transfers may help overcome borrowing
constraints. Data from recent national surveys reported in table 1 support that transfers are
frequent in Burkina7. About 39 percent of rural households surveyed in 1994 and 42 percent of
those surveyed in 1998 report some transfer activity, either as donor, recipient, or both. About 40
percent and 43 percent of urban households were involved in some transfer activity in the same
periods, indicating that transfers are not limited to rural areas. Transfers contributed on average
to 36 percent and to 19 percent in rural recipient households income in 1994 and 1998, respectively,
and to 15 percent and 16 percent in urban recipient households in 1994 and 1998, respectively.
Most rural households were recipient only: 26.3 percent received transfers in 1994 and 28 percent
in 1998, while most urban households were donors only, 22 percent and 21 percent in 1994 and
1998. This suggests that eventual interactions between private and public transfers might impact
the welfare of a large fraction of the population. This observation is reenforced by the renewed
interest in the provision of social protection and formal risk management mechanisms to low income
households (e.g. Ravallion, 2003)8.
The empirical evidence on both the existence and the magnitude of transfer response to income
is, however, mixed. A number of studies (e.g. Cox and Jakubson, 1995; Cox and Rank, 1992;
Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko®, 1997) have found a signi¯cant but small e®ect of public transfers
on private ones. In contrast, other studies (e.g. Cox and Jimenez, 1992, 1995; Cox, Hansen, and
Jimenez, 2004) found a substantial e®ect of the displacement of private transfers by public ones.
Furthermore, empirical results from developed countries may be of little relevance for policy guid-
ance in low-income countries, partly because the settings di®er and partly because the research
focus in developed countries is dominated by inter-generational transfers (inter-vivos or bequests)
while intra-generational transfers are equally important in low-income countries. There are four
possible explanations to the weak transfer response uncovered in numerous empirical studies. First,
several small presents in the form of goods and services which add up to an equivalent value. In practice
before he has received an equal amount in return, he may ask his young brother for some maize, which
at this point in their transactions reverse the obligation. The next gift should move the other way (...)
All the Moose men, women and children participate in this system and are usually involved in several
such reciprocal relations at any time(...) The object is not to close such transactions, but to keep them
going."
6If these social norms are actually enforced and even if the donor does not care for the economic well-being of the
recipient (as assumed by the altruistic model), the transfer pattern will be observationally equivalent to that implied
by altruistic models.
7These surveys are the ¯rst and second Priority Surveys conducted by the Institut National de la Statistique et
de la Demographie.
8For discussion on social protection programs in Africa, see World Bank (2001). For the speci¯c case of Burkina,
see World Bank (2004). For a more comprehensive coverage of the World Bank interventions in social protection in
low-income countries, see http://www1.worldbank.org/sp.4
analysis using data from developed countries is less likely to ¯nd signi¯cant crowding-out e®ect,
because public transfers have already reduced private ones (Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez, 2004). Sec-
ond, the response of private transfers might di®er depending on the type of public interventions.
For instance, Cox and Jimenez (1995) estimate that an unemployment insurance system would
have a strong crowding-out e®ect in the Philippines, while the degree of crowding-out associated
with pensions is much less signi¯cant. Since pension is likely to be permanent and unemployment
insurance is more transitory, a possible interpretation of Cox and Jimenez's ¯nding is that transfer
response to permanent and to transitory income di®ers. This point has received little attention in
the transfer literature. Third, it is possible that transfers be motivated by altruism when recipient
income is low, and then exchange motives become determinant when the recipient income reaches
a certain threshold (Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez, 2004). Such a transfer behavior generates non-
linearities in the response function, which if not properly controlled may bias the estimates. Finally,
and in addition to these concerns, there are the long standing issues associated with selection into
transfer transactions and income endogeneity. This line of reasoning suggests that tests for transfer
response to income must focus on areas where private transfers are (or believed to be) important
and must address the related estimation issues.
This paper makes two contributions to the existing literature on transfer behavior. The ¯rst
contribution lies in the focus on Burkina, a region where gift exchanges are important according to
anthropological and sociological work, but where transfer behavior has received relatively little at-
tention from economists. The second contribution, presumably the more important, is the attempt
to address a range of estimation issues including self selection into transfers transactions, income
endogeneity, and non-linearities of the transfer response function, which may have substantially
in°uenced the conclusions drawn from previous studies. While these issues have been addressed
separately in di®erent studies, it is conceivable that grappling with them using a unique dataset
could shed new insights on the transfer response to income. Finally, by adapting income instru-
menting techniques used in the risk-sharing literature, the study is able to disentangle the in°uence
of permanent and transitory income on transfers received, an issue which has been only implicit in
previous studies.
The main ¯ndings can be summarized as follows. While it is apparent from the descriptive
analysis that private transfers reduce income inequality, the econometric analysis points to a rel-
atively small transfer response to income. In addition, transfer reaction to income is relatively
smaller at the lowest income level compared to the medium income level, contrasting with recent
¯ndings by Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez in the Philippines who ¯nd relatively larger transfer response
at low income level. This suggests that in the context of Burkina, crowding out e®ects may not be
an issue for very low income level, implying that public transfers targeting the poorest households
could be e®ective. There is also evidence of weak transfer response to transitory income suggest-
ing that insurance role in transfers is minimal. It is also apparent that ignoring the non-linearity5
in the transfer-income relationship and income endogeneity with respect to transfers may lead to
misleading estimated transfer response to income.
The ¯ndings provide some insights into human nature and the underlying motivations for private
transfers, although the results are far from conclusive. For example, the lack of transfer response
to income at very low income level combined with the relatively strong response at medium income
level suggests that there may be a threshold below which changes in income do not a®ect transfer,
a pattern which contrast with both altruistic and exchange transfer motives as described in the
literature. It is also apparent that risk sharing motivated transfers are observed only for relatively
large income shocks, a pattern which is consistent if only large income shocks are easily observable.
This may re°ect a seasonal pattern of transfers, where poor people transfer out immediately after
harvest while rich people transfer out later during the slack season, is more consistent with reciprocal
gift exchanges described by the anthropological literature.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The second section presents the analytical
framework. The third section discusses the data. The fourth section discusses the empirical strate-
gies. The ¯fth section presents the estimation results, and the sixth section concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
The analytical framework developed by Cox (1987) is used to motivate transfer functions, which
relates transfers received to the recipient income. The model generates two predictions on the
relationship between the recipient income and the amount of transfers received. On the one hand,
if transfers are altruistically motivated, then transfers received should decrease as the recipient
income increases. On the other hand, transfers received will decrease as recipient income rises if
exchanges were the underlying motive. Moreover, under certain circumstances, the model allows
transfers to rise with recipient income.
Formally, assume that there are two individuals, the donor denoted d and the recipient denoted
r. The amount of transfer is T, and the recipient provides some services S to the donor, which by
assumption do not have market substitute. Furthermore, I assume a one-sided altruism from the
donor. The donor utility U is increasing in his consumption of an aggregate good Cd, the amount
of services consumed S and the recipient utility V. The last relationship captures altruism in the
model. The recipient utility V is increasing in his consumption Cr and decreasing in S. The donor
solves the following program:6
Ud = U(Cd;S;V (Cr;S)) (1a)
Cd = Id ¡ T (1b)
Cr = Ir + T (1c)
V (Ir + T;S) ¸ V0(Ir;0) (1d)
Equations (1b) and (1c) represent the budget constraints faced by the donor and the recipient
respectively. Equation (1d) is the participation constraint, which states that the recipient entering
in the relationship must not lower his utility. Cox (1987) shows that this program generates two
regimes, depending on whether the participation constraint is binding or not.
Under the ¯rst regime, the participation constraint is not binding (V > V0). The transfers are
then altruistically motivated, and the recipient is more than compensated for his services. The net
transfers received decrease with the recipient income. Assuming interior solution, the predicted
relationship between transfers and income is @T=@Id ¡ @T=@Ir = 1, which is the transfer income
derivative tested by Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko® (1997). In other words, conditional upon
transfers having been made, a decrease of one unit in the donor income followed by an identical
increase in the recipient income, leaves the transfer amount unchanged.
Under the second regime, the participation constraint is binding (for instance, the recipient
pre-transfer income is high enough), the transfers are motivated by exchanges, and the recipient
is compensated for his services. This regime can be pictured as if transfers were made in order to
compensate services S which have an implicit price P. Thus the relationship between transfers and
services is expressed as: T = PS. Cox shows that transfers ¯rst increase with income and then fall,
thus generating an inverted U shape9. Both motives may co-exist in the same dataset, occurring
at di®erent income levels, thereby inducing non-linearities of the transfer response.
In the empirical work, permanent and transitory incomes will enter the transfers function sep-
arately. This speci¯cation is then used to explore the role of transfers in risk sharing. From the
risk-sharing model (Cochrane, 1991; Townsend, 1994), if the sole purpose of transfers were cop-
ing with unpredicted income shocks, then only transitory income a®ects transfers, and permanent
9 More formally, the argument proceeds as follows:
@T
@Ir
=
@S
@Ir
P +
@P
@Ir
S
.
The ¯rst term of the right-hand side is negative and the second term positive. Thus, the overall e®ect depends
on whether the price or the quantity e®ect dominates. Cox shows that the price e®ect will initially dominate, and
then the quantity e®ect dominates as the recipient decreases the quantity of services at certain pre-transfer income
levels. Thus, the transfers ¯rst increase with income and then fall. One should note the argument that this pattern is
consistent with exchange-motivated transfers but does not constitute a proof of exchange-motivated transfers, since
other behavior may generate similar empirical patterns. For instance, see Lucas and Stark (1985) for the relationship
between remittances and home household income in Botswana.7
income should not be a signi¯cant determinant of transfers10.
3 Data and Descriptive statistics
The paper uses the two rounds of the national priority surveys conducted in 1994 and in 1998.
The two surveys are similar in the scope of the information collected, the sampling design, and
the coverage. The surveys are closely related to the World Bank LSMS, and are intended to be
nationally representative; the sample selection uses a two-stage strati¯ed random sampling. The
number of households interviewed was 8700 in 1994 and 8478 in 1998.
The surveys collected information on household and individual characteristics, employment
status, expenditures, and income. Information on transfers was collected at the household level.
Transfers given were collected along the consumption module with a recall period covering the
month preceding the survey, while transfers received were collected along with the income module
with a recall period covering the previous twelve months. Two issues are related to these di®erences
in the recall periods. First, if seasonal variations are important, then transfers given are more likely
to be misreported. Second, if intra-annual in°ation is important, then nominal values of transfers
given and received might re°ect, in fact, di®erent real values (Paxson, 1992).
Annual transfers given are obtained by multiplying monthly values by 12. This procedure is
not valid if there is a strong seasonal pattern in transfers so that the probability that a respondent
reports non-zero transfer varies with the survey month. In table 2, I report both the frequency
of non-zero transfers given and transfer size for each month. It is apparent from table 2 that
the frequency of transfer °ow is stable across the two years. In each year, approximately 15
percent of the surveyed rural households report positive transfers given, although the 1994 survey
had been conducted between October and January, and the 1998 survey between May and July.
Approximately 28 percent in 1994 and 27 percent in 1998 of urban households reported positive
transfers given out. In columns (3) and (4), I report the unconditional mean of transfer size and a
t-test whether there is a signi¯cant di®erence between the average mean in a given month and that
of the remaining months. Although in 1998 one cannot reject that mean transfers are equal across
survey months, in 1994 mean transfers reported in November and December were di®erent from
those reported in January and in October, for both the urban and the rural samples. A potential
explanation of these di®erences is that harvest occurs in November and December, and most in kind
transfers are given during this period (e.g. Ellsworth and Shapiro, 1989). This interpretation does
not explain, however, why transfers given in January are larger than those given in December. Since
there is no clear pattern in these di®erences, I will attribute them to sampling errors and include
month dummies in all the regressions to control systematic changes which may be associated with
10This hypothesis can be understood through the risk-sharing literature. In the formal risk-sharing
model (Townsend, 1994; Cochrane, 1991; Mace, 1991), changes in income, and not permanent income, are redis-
tributed to smooth individual consumption within the insurance group.8
the survey period.
- Insert tables 3, 4 and 5 about here.
Descriptive statistics are reported in tables 3, 4 and 5, and a summary of all the variables used in
the analysis is presented in tables 13 and 14 in the appendix. Tables 3 and 4 report private transfers
expressed in local currency units (CFA Franc) per adult in rural and urban areas, respectively. Pre-
transfer income is income per adult before transfers, and post-transfer income includes net transfers
received11. In both rural and urban areas, in 1994 and 1998, recipients had the lowest pre-transfer
average income per adult. It can bee seen that transfers reduce the income gap between recipient
households and the autarkic group. For rural households in 1994, the income ranking between the
two groups even reverts after transfers have been accounted for. Next, the sample is split by wealth
quartile, using non-durable expenditures per adult as a wealth indicator. Net transfers were positive
but decreasing in magnitude as one moves from the ¯rst to the third quartile (the ¯rst to the second
quartile in 1998 for urban households). For the highest income quartile (the high two quartiles for
urban households in 1998), net transfers were negative. This suggests that transfers °ow from
wealthier to poorer households, and thus may have an equalizing e®ect. Note that, although the
absolute numbers di®er between the two years, the qualitative pattern is similar, suggesting a rather
stable pattern of private transfers over time. Further evidence of the equalizing e®ects of transfers
is provided in table 5. The table reports pre- and post-transfers income and consumption inequality
as measured by Gini and Theil maximum entropy coe±cients. The point estimates are reported
along with bootstrapped standard errors12. In both years, transfers substantially altered welfare
distribution, whether expressed in income or in expenditures. Considering income inequality, the
Gini coe±cient dropped from .571 to .555 in 1994 and from .497 to .474 in 1998 after net transfers
were taken into account, in rural areas. In urban areas, the Gini coe±cient dropped from .513 to
.506 in 1994 and from .489 to .477 in 1998. The Theil inequality measure also indicated a similar
pattern. Transfers had an equalizing e®ect on both income and expenditure distributions. Cox and
Jimenez (1995) have reached similar conclusions for the Philippines. These descriptive statistics
suggest that the e®ects of income redistribution policies may be dampened by potential interactions
between private and public transfers. It is apparent that if private transfers are responsive to to
household income, the net e®ects of policies seeking to modify income distribution may be reduced.
4 Empirical strategies
As discussed in the introduction, transfer response estimate may be too sensitive to estimation
methods and to how income enters the regression. The empirical approach followed in this paper
consists in using di®erent estimations methods in order to eke out more from the data than one
11Net transfer is calculated as transfer received minus transfer given.
12Bootstrap consisted of 500 replications, correcting for the two-step sampling process.9
would learn from a single estimation strategy. I start with a general speci¯cation of the transfer
function, which follows Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko® (1997) and Altonji and Ichimura (2000):
T = m(Ir;Id;X;") (2)
where T is net transfers received, Ir is the recipient income, Id is the donor income, X is a set of
controls describing household characteristics that contribute to determine transfer °ows. Empirical
estimations of (2) are confronted with a number of econometric problems. First, a linear functional
form may be a poor approximation of m, especially the relationship between transfers and income
(see Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez, 2004, for a discussion). Second, unless one imposes strong assump-
tions, the underlying economic model implies that the error term may not be separable with respect
to the other covariates. Third, while both the recipient and the donor incomes enter the transfer
function, information is often available only for one transfer partner. The income parameter is
estimated with a potential bias if income is correlated between the two transfer partners. Fourth,
income may not be exogenously given with respect to transfers so that one needs to instrument for
income in order to have consistent estimates. I elaborate more on these issues below.
4.1 Spline speci¯cation
The ¯rst speci¯cation follows Cox and Jimenez (1995) and Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004), and
uses a spline regression (Greene, 1997), which allows the income parameter to vary over di®erent
income quartiles13. The spline regression is expressed as follows14:
Ti =
4 X
k
°kIi ¢ I(Ii 2 k) + ¯Xi + "i (3)
Where Ti is net transfer received by household i, k indicates pre-transfer income quartiles, Ii
is household i's pre-transfer income, I is an index variable which is equal to one for Ii falling in
quartile k and zero otherwise, and X is a set of variables that a®ect transfers received.
As is apparent from table 1, more than half of the respondent households neither give nor
receive transfers, suggesting that transfers do not adjust smoothly to changes in income. There are
both theoretical and econometrical motivations to account explicitly for this large fraction of corner
households. Transaction costs associated with transfers, as described by Honore, Kyriazidou, and
Udry (1997) or by Udry (1994), would imply that positive transfers are observed only when latent
transfers exceed the transaction costs. Alternatively, this pattern may rise if transfers take place
within networks, and if there are ¯xed costs associated with network participation. Regardless of
13Note that Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) do not impose the spline's knots a priori.
14From here after, I will include only one party's income when writing the transfer function, since there is no
information on the other party, including her income. The omitted variable bias resulting from omitting the second
party's income is discussed later.10
the theoretical explanations, ignoring the presence of the large number of zero values will result
in biased inference similar to what occurs with censoring. Following Udry (1994), I use Rosett's
friction model (Rosett, 1959) to account for the presence of non-participant households.
T =
8
> > > <
> > > :
T¤ ¡ ¿1 if T¤ < ¿1;
0 if ¿1 · T¤ · ¿2;
T¤ + ¿2 if T¤ > ¿2
(4)
where T¤ is latent net transfer, ¿1 and ¿2 are unobserved transaction costs, and T denotes
the parametric transfer function as de¯ned in (3)15. The transaction costs set thresholds that the
latent transfers (positive or negative) must exceed in order for one to observe any transfer. This
model is estimated by maximum likelihood methods using the likelihood function proposed by
Maddala (Maddala, 1983, pages 163-164 ).
4.2 Altonji and Ichimura estimator
The speci¯cations above impose that unobservables summarized in the error term enter the transfers
function in a separable manner. However, Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko® (1997) show that unless
one imposes strong assumptions on the utility function, X and ² are non-separable in the transfer
function. It follows that speci¯cations which impose separability between X and ² may be biased,
and the direction of the bias is unknown. This motivates a second estimation strategy, which is
based on a semi-parametric estimator developed by Altonji and Ichimura (2000). The objective is
to recover an estimate of the population average of the marginal e®ect E
h
@T¤(I)
@Ii jI;T > 0
i
for the
self-selected sub-sample with positive transfers. Altonji and Ichimura (2000) and Altonji, Hayashi,
and Kotliko® (1997) show that an estimate of this expression can be obtained as follows:
E
·
@T¤(X;²)
@Ii
jX;T > 0
¸
=
@T(X;²)
@Ii
+
@P (T(X;²) > 0jX)
@Ii
¢
T(X;²)
P (T > 0)
(5)
The A-I estimator is implemented by replacing the right side in (5) with estimates obtained
using a global polynomial (in income) approximation to the regression function E [T(X;²)jX;T > 0]
and the probability function P(T(Ii;²) > 0jX), where income and other covariates are included in
X16. Because I have information only for one transfer partner, the left hand side of (5) is evaluated
separately for donors and recipients. An approximation of the expression @T=@Id¡@T=@Ir is given
as: E
h
@T¤(Id)
@Id jId;T > 0
i
¡ E
h
@T¤(Ir)
@Ir jIr;T > 0
i
In implementing the A-I estimator, the probability of giving is corrected for the recall period.
In particular, I take into account the fact that the probability of giving transfer would have been
15Recall that by convention, transfers given are negative and transfers received are positive.
16I follow Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko® (1997) and use the bootstrap to compute the standard errors.11
di®erent if the recall period was the previous twelve months. Suppose that in any given month, the
probability of transferring out pm, so that the probability of not transferring is 1 ¡ pm. Assuming
that the probability of observing non-zero transfer given in any two months is independent17:
Pa(T > 0) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ Pm)12 (6)
4.3 Semiparametric estimation of the transfer response
The two estimation strategies presented so far seek to summarize the transfer response into a set
of parameters. An alternative is a graphical exploration of the transfer response to income, using
a partial linear speci¯cation in order to control the e®ects of the other covariates. The transfer
response is speci¯ed as follows:
T = g(Ir) + ¯X + ² (7)
where all variables have been de¯ned before. The attractiveness of this speci¯cation is that
no assumption is imposed on g but smoothness and continuity in Ir. The main disadvantage
is that no parameter is estimated. Examining the general shape of the function may, however,
reveal some features of the transfer response function that cannot be summarized easily by a set
of parameters. The function g is estimated non-parametrically after partialling out the e®ects of
the other covariates (Robinson, 1988). Compared to speci¯cation (2), equation (7) imposes that
the transfer function is linear in all other covariates but the recipient income, and the error term
is additive18.
4.4 Measure of income
There are at least three concerns with income, which is the key variable in the transfer function.
First, it is well documented that income is measured with errors, especially in developing rural areas
where income is derived from various activities that are di±cult to evaluate. Second, if households
17Although the independence assumption seems too strong, it insures simplicity.
18The estimation proceeds in two steps as follows. First, the parameter ¯ is estimated by estimating separately
the nonparametric relationships between T and I, and between X and I, by forming the residuals, and regressing
the residuals of T on those of X. Second, the estimated ^ ¯ is used to estimate the function g. The nonparametric
estimator used here is the Fan (1992) locally weighted least square estimator with a quartic kernel. The two steps
are written as:
^ ¯ =
"
N X
i=1
(Xi ¡ ^ E[XijIi])(Xi ¡ ^ E[XijIi])
0
#¡1 "
N X
i=1
(X ¡ ^ E[XijIi])(Ti ¡ ^ E[TijIi])
#0
^ g(Ii) = ^ E[Ti=Ii] ¡ E[XijIi]^ ¯
When I instrument for income, the error term of the ¯rst stage regression is included in X as well, see Yatchew (2003,
p. 87).12
expect transfers, then they might adjust their labor and hence their income accordingly, in such a
way that transfers determine income, leading to reverse causality19. Third, both the recipient and
the donor incomes enter the transfer function, while in the dataset income is never observed for the
two transfer partners. This results in an omitted variable bias, whose size and sign depend on the
correlation between the recipient and the donor incomes.
To correct the ¯rst two sources of bias, I instrument for income following the approach used
by Paxson (1992) to analyze household savings in Thailand. The approach consists of using long-
run regional rainfall data and the household level information to identify the permanent and the
transitory parts of income. Assuming that current rainfall deviation from its long-run mean is
unpredictable, permanent household characteristics and annual decisions such as farm size and type
of crops grown interacted with current deviations in rainfall provide a measure of the transitory
income. This identi¯cation approach exploits the strong dependence of farm outcomes on rainfall
(e.g. Alderman and Paxson, 1994; Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas, 1998; Paxson, 1992). To the
extent that production on di®erent types of land responds di®erently to similar rainfall levels, and
land allocation is made at the beginning of the season when rainfall level is unknown, land types and
rainfall interactions could be used to derive unanticipated income shocks20. The approach has also
the advantage of allowing a decomposition of income in permanent and transitory components21.
Formally, denoting permanent by P and transitory by S, the income equation is written as:
Iir = ¯t + ¯0r + ¯1XP
irt + ¯2XS
irt + ¯3Zirt + "irt (8)
where XP represents characteristics that are permanent to the household, XS represents char-
acteristics that determine transitory income, and Z is a set of variables that in°uence both income
and transfers. Variables in Z are the household demographic, the head education, and his gender.
As determinants of permanent income, I use livestock possessions (cattle, goats, and sheep), farm
and other assets, and the type of crop grown as proxies for soil types. The transitory income
determinants are rainfall deviations in the region and their interaction with XP and Z.
The main identi¯cation assumption is that the set of variables in XP and XS have no direct
in°uence on transfers given or received, except through their e®ects on income. The estimated
parameters are used to ¯t separately permanent and transitory incomes. The residual is the \un-
explained" part of income (Paxson, 1992). Region ¯xed e®ects and rainfall variations are identi¯ed
separately in regression 8 only when using the pooled sample (Paxson, 1992, p. 21). When the
19For instance, the household may purposely send some of its members in di®erent locations to work and remit
resources.
20Although information on illness incidence within the household could have been included, detailed information
on illness spells was not available. Nevertheless, rainfall variability may capture the largest fraction of income risk in
these areas.
21Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) address some of the limitations associated with using unanticipated rainfall
variations to predict permanent and transitory income in areas where labor markets are nearly non-existent and
family labor is important in farm income. I will return to these issues later when I discuss the empirical results.13
analysis is conducted for each year separately, it is assumed that rainfall deviations capture all
regional ¯xed e®ects. For urban households, employment types, possession of durable goods (cars,
motorbikes), and housing type are used to predict permanent income, and the residual is treated as
transitory income. Therefore, the transitory income for urban households includes some elements
of unexplained income. Estimation results for these ¯rst-stage regressions are shown in appendix
B, in tables 15 and 16 for the rural and urban samples, respectively. It can be seen that in all
regressions, the F joint test on the signi¯cance of the instruments are signi¯cant at the 1 percent
level22. This suggests that the instruments used provide enough information to identify the income
e®ects in the transfer function.
There is no information in the data sets which could be used to control e®ectively for the omitted
variable bias. It is, however, to identify the sign of the bias and with reasonable assumption
correlation between the recipient and the donor income, to determine the upper bound of bias.
Consider the following linear speci¯cation of the transfer function.
Ti = ®0 + ®1Iri + ®2Idi + "i (9)
If we abstract from the zero censoring and other speci¯cation issues, then OLS can be used to
uncover consistent estimates from (9). When information for one party is missing, then instead of
(9) one estimates the following:
Ti = ®0 + ®1Iri + ¹i (10)
where ¹i = "i + ®2Idi
The estimates are consistent only if the omitted variable (the donor income) is not correlated
with any covariate in equation (10). However, in general one might expect non-zero correlation
between the donor and the recipient income, or between speci¯c income components. In fact, it
may be that these correlations motivate transfers in the ¯rst place. If we assume that only incomes
are correlated, then the omitted variable bias can be expressed in standard form as:
^ ®1 = ®1 + ®2
cov(Ir;Id)
var(Ir)
(11)
In general, we expect ®2 to be positive, thus implying that the sign of the bias is determined by
the numerator in the last term at the right hand side of (11). Moreover, one can think of ®2 = 1
as the limiting case, when the donor transfers all increment in his income to the recipient23. This
implies that the upper limit of the bias is:
cov(Ir;Id)
var(Ir) .
From equation (11), it is apparent that instrumenting may not attenuate the omitted variable
bias if the numerator (i.e. the covariance between the recipient and the donor income) is relatively
22Calculated F-statistics vary from 18.66 to 67.66 for the rural sample and from 12.01 to 42.00 for the urban sample
23Or @T=@Ir = 0 in the relationship: @T=@Id ¡ @T=@Ir = 1.14
large compared to the denominator (the variance of the recipient income)24. Cox and Rank (1992)
and Cox and Jakubson (1995) compared estimates of (10) and (11) and concluded that the bias
is positive and small. It appears that instrumenting attenuates the bias for transitory income but
increases it for permanent income.
In discussing the omitted variable bias, I have assumed that the transfer function is actually
linear and OLS would have delivered consistent estimates, in absence of omitted variables. However,
the estimation strategies discussed previously do not rely extensively on OLS. Therefore, it is
clear that the omitted variable bias given by equation (11) is not valid when one uses the limited
dependent variable or the friction model.
I do not pursue an analytical derivation of the bias when the dependent variable is censored.
Instead, I use Monte Carlo simulations to explore how sensitive the bias is under alternative esti-
mation strategies: OLS applied to the net transfers, Tobit applied to one-side gross transfers, and
Rosett Tobit applied to net transfers. The experiments assume that the data generation process
follows an equation like (9) where ®1 = ¡:3 and ®2 = :3. The estimated version is equation
(10), which corresponds to omitting the donor's income. The ¯rst set of experiments assumes
zero covariance between donor and recipient income. The second set of experiments assumes that
covariance is .25 between recipient and donor income. Estimations using OLS, Tobit, and Rosett
Tobit are reported in table 6 for di®erent sample sizes. Beneath the rows showing point estimates,
are reported the standard errors and the absolute deviations from the true values.
- Insert table 6 about here.
The experiments suggest that OLS outperforms the other estimation methods if recipient and
donor incomes are not correlated. However, when recipient and donor incomes are correlated,
Rosett Tobit outperforms both OLS and the standard Tobit, both in terms of consistency and
e±ciency. Moreover, the relative performance of Rosett Tobit increases with the sample size. In
light of these results, and given my sample size and the likelihood that income is correlated, I treat
the Rosett Tobit results as my preferred estimates25.
A ¯nal concern with respect to identi¯cation is household size and composition. Although
there are a number of reasons why it may not be desirable to treat the household composition as
given, the concern is even more serious with respect to transfers. If observed household structure
results from migration decisions and transfers received are correlated with the number of migrated
members, then the coe±cients of household composition are biased26. More speci¯cally, if one
24In order to have an idea of the size of the bias, I use observed income, predicted permanent income, and predicted
transitory income to approximate (11). The implied upper limit of the bias is .15 if one uses observed income. After
instrumenting, the bias increases for permanent income (.17) and decreases for transitory income (.01)
25I do not present the Tobit estimates since the results are not signi¯cantly changed.
26For instance, it is a widespread practice for households to send members to the main city to look for o®-farm jobs
or to the neighboring Ivory Coast to work on the cash-crop plantations. In many instances, when migrants anticipate
a short stay, for example, they may leave their wives behind and remit some money. This will lead to a positive
correlation between household size and transfers received, and between female headship and transfers received.15
admits a positive relationship between transfers received and the number of household members
who have migrated, then the direction of the bias depends on how observed household composition
is related with the numbers of migrant members27. I do not attempt to control for the endogeneity
of household structure with respect to transfers. Thus, the coe±cients associated with these vari-
ables should be interpreted as correlations, at best providing only some suggestive evidence on the
directions of the causal relationships.
5 Results and discussions
5.1 Spline speci¯cations
Table 7 shows estimated transfer functions in rural areas. Estimation results for 1994 and 1998
are reported in the ¯rst four columns and in the middle four columns, respectively. Results for the
pooled sample are shown in the last four columns. Transfer response to income is shown for the
lowest to the highest income quartile, in rows one to four. For each set of results, the ¯rst pair
of columns report OLS and IVE estimation results, ignoring the censored nature of the dependent
variable. The second pair uses the Rosett Tobit in an attempt to control for the non-participation
constraint. Looking across all regressions, it is apparent that ignoring the censoring understates
the transfer response. Moreover, the friction coe±cients are large and statistically signi¯cant. The
results for urban households are presented in table 8 and in the same order as in table 7. These
two results put together suggest that the Rosett Tobit estimates are preferable, as indicated by the
Monte carlo simulations discussed above.
- Insert tables 7 and 8 about here.
For the remaining of the results shown in these tables, I focus on the censoring-corrected esti-
mates. For the 1994 rural sample, lowest income quartile group has the largest transfer response to
income (-.27), when measured income is used in the estimations28. This relatively large e®ect drops
to -.017 (column 4) when income is instruments for. And households in the second income quartile
have the largest transfer response estimate, i.e. -.15 (column 4, row 3). Comparing the ¯rst four
rows of columns seven and eight, it can be seen that estimated transfer response to income when
one uses measured income are larger for relatively low-income households in contrast to the IVE
27Using the transfer function, the bias can be characterized as follows:
E(Tjx) = ¯1 + ¯2x + ¯3E(mjx)
where x is observed household members, and m is the number of household members who have migrated, which was
unobserved in the survey (hence unavailable to the researcher). Let us abstract from other explanatory variables and
maintain that ¯3 > 0. Then, OLS leads to an upward bias if
@m
@x > 0, to a downward bias if
@m
@x < 0, and to unbiased
estimates if
@m
@x = 0. For instance, if I suppose that small households are small because of out-migration, then the
estimates are upward biased. On the other hand, it may be that only at certain sizes do households let members
migrate; in this case, there is an upward bias.
28Because the interest is on the response of transfer to income, conditional on transfer being made, the coe±cients
and not the marginal e®ects are used.16
estimates which predict a negligible income e®ect on transfer at low income level but a substantial
e®ect for the middle income households. This pattern is supported by estimation results using
the pooled sample (where the identi¯cation strategy is arguably more robust as earlier discussed).
Transfer response to income in the lowest income quartile decreases from -.12 (and statistically sig-
ni¯cant at the ¯ve percent level) to -.02 (and not statistically signi¯cant) as one moves from column
(11) to (12) along the ¯rst row. At the same time, the transfer derivative increases from -.13 to
-.12, and from -.03 to -.13 in the third and the fourth income quartiles, respectively. This pattern
of results holds for the urban sample, shown in table 8. Restricting to the censoring-corrected
estimates which I treat as my preferred ones, estimates using measured income clearly overstate
the transfer response for the lowest income group. The transfer response to income decreases from
-.34 to -.07 (not signi¯cant) in 1994, -.37 to -.17 in 1998 and from -.40 to -.14 for the pooled sample.
Abstracting from the relatively small size of the coe±cients, these results have some implications
on both the interpretation of transfer motives and policy decisions. It is apparent that estimates
based on measured income are more consistent with altruistic transfers, which predict that transfer
response to income is stronger the lower the recipient income (e.g. Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez,
2004). In terms of policy decisions, estimated transfer response using measured income implies
that crowding e®ects may be larger for the lowest income groups, therefore the e®ect of public
transfers to this group may be dampened by compensatory reduction in private transfers. These
implications are rejected by the IVE estimations, which, however, depends on the validity of the
identi¯cation strategy. More interestingly, the IVE estimates suggest that transfers do not react
to income before one reaches the second income quartile, suggesting e±cient public transfers (in
terms of minimal crowding out e®ects) can be designed based on a set of observables which predict
income.
In order to detect whether di®erent income components have distinct e®ects on transfer, per-
manent and transitory income are entered separately in the regressions reported in tables 9 and 10
for rural and urban households, respectively. In each table, estimation results for 1994 and 1998
are presented in the ¯rst three and the following three columns, respectively. Estimation results
using the pooled sample are shown in the last three columns. Conditional on transfer being made,
one additional unit in recipient permanent income is met with a reduction of .14 and .12 unit of net
transfers in 1994 and 1998, respectively, and .13 for the pooled sample. This suggests that average
transfer response to permanent income is stable across years. In columns (3) and (6) for 1994 and
1998, respectively, and column (9) for the pooled sample, transfer response to permanent income
varies by income quartile. There is some evidence that the permanent income does not matter for
the lowest income group: the estimated coe±cients are -.08, -.04, and -.05 in 1994, 1998, and for
the pooled sample, respectively, and none is statistically signi¯cant. The absence of response in
the lowest income group contrasts with the relatively large response in the second income quartile:
-.25 in 1994, -.20 in 1998, and -.23 for the pooled sample.17
Results for urban households are presented in table 10. The transfer derivatives for the lowest
income group are signi¯cant and larger than those for the lowest income group in the rural areas.
For the 1994 sub-sample, the pattern is similar to that of rural households: transfer derivative for
the lowest income group is smaller than that for the next two income groups. In 1998, transfer
derivative for the lowest income group is larger than that of the second income quartile. Overall,
these results suggest two caveats. First, the evidence suggests a stronger response of transfer to
income in the middle income class, while transfer in the lowest income group is almost insensitive
to income. This could be interpreted as a re°ection of the observation made by Mahieu (2000), who
reports that transfers in West Africa involve the upper class of the poor households and the lower
class of the rich households. However, this is not consistent with the descriptive statistics (see tables
3 and 4) where transfer in°ows to the lowest income quartile are the most important. A possible
interpretation is that while transfer receipts are important for the lowest income group, transfer
°ows do not respond to income below a certain threshold level29, implying that private transfers to
these households are unlikely to be reduced in the event of public transfers. It is when households
move into the next income class that substantial crowding-out e®ects are observed. Second, the
response to permanent income remains relatively strong despite the presence of transitory income.
This contradicts risk-sharing motivated transfers whereby all transfer activities are explained by
transitory income shocks. Therefore it is likely that risk-sharing motives are not the only driving
factor of observed transfers.
- Insert tables 9 and 10 about here.
The sixth row in each table contains transfer response to transitory income. The seventh and
the eighth rows report transfer response to positive and negative transitory income, respectively30.
In rural areas, there is a sharp di®erence of transfer response to transitory income between the two
years, -.05 in 1994 and -.17 in 1998, which contrasts with a rather stable response in urban areas
(-.12 in 1994 and -.11 in 1998). In columns (2) and (3) for 1994 and (5) and (6) for 1998, positive
29Later partial linear estimation results provide more support for this interpretation.
30Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) discuss extensively the issues associated with using rainfall variations to identify
permanent and transitory income components. In particular, they point out that if income is measured as farm gross
output minus hired input costs, and family labor value is not accounted for, income variations due to rainfall may be
overestimated. A simple characterization of the implied bias is as follows.
dy
dr
=
@y
@r
+
@y
@l
dl
dr
where the unanticipated and exogenous response of income to rainfall is given by the ¯rst term of the RHS, which
we assume is positive. The second term of the RHS is a product of labor marginal productivity (
@y
@l ) and labor
response to rainfall (
dl
dr). If this second term of the RHS is positive, my instruments over-state the changes in income
entirely attributable to rainfall, that is, the role of transitory income will be overestimated.
For the speci¯c context of Burkina, Udry (1996) using data from a sample of six villages ¯nd that marginal labor
productivity is .31 for adult and .20 for child. Using the same data as in Udry (1996), Kazianga and Udry (2004)
¯nd a negative and insigni¯cant labor response to rainfall variations: on average, annual total labor decreases by 16
hours for 100 mm deviation in rainfall. Together these results suggest that the transfer response to transitory income
is upward biased (in absolute value), but the bias is not large enough to invalidate the conclusions that I draw.18
and negative shocks are permitted to have di®erent e®ects. It can be seen that an increase of one
unit in transitory income is met with reduction of 0.04 and .20 unit in net transfers in 1994 and in
1998, respectively, and .13 unit for the pooled sample, and the three coe±cients are signi¯cant at
the one percent level. A decrease of one unit in transitory income is met with an increase of .08
and .11 unit in net transfers in 1994 and 1998, respectively, and .11 unit for the pooled sample.
The coe±cients are signi¯cant for the 1998 sample and the pooled sample only. This suggests that
only a small fraction of the transitory income may enter any risk-sharing pool, and in any case net
transfers are far from completely compensating for changes in transitory income. This result may
re°ect the absence of e±cient risk-sharing, a result which is supported by analysis from a smaller
rural household sample from Burkina Faso (see Kazianga and Udry, 2004). Note, however, that
while transfers given consecutive to positive shocks are entirely under the control of the respondent,
transfers received in compensation of negative shocks are to a greater degree determined by the
unobserved transfer partner. It is then likely that the omitted variable bias is larger for the latter
estimate. Put together, the relatively weak transfer response to transitory income in 1994 and the
relatively strong response in 1998 could indicate that transfers in compensation to income shocks
do not take place immediately after harvest but later in the slack season, as observed by Ellsworth
and Shapiro (1989) in a sample of villages in Burkina.
As noted before, the de¯nition of transitory income for urban households includes elements of
unexplained income components. However, as is apparent for rural households, the unexplained
income component turns out to have a very small e®ect. It is apparent that on average, transfer
response to permanent income is similar to that of rural households (about -.1 in 1994 and -.17 in
1998).
Turning to the friction coe±cients, the negative ones can be interpreted as self-side giving costs
while the positive ones could be interpreted as self-side receiving costs. The di®erence between the
two coe±cients (i.e. ¿2 ¡ ¿1) gives the size of transaction costs associated with transfers activities.
In other words, individuals planning to make transfers less than the transaction costs refrain to
do so. Using the estimates reported in table 9 and columns (3) and (6), these transactions costs
are estimated at CFA 27494 in 1994 and at 30615 in 1998, for the rural sample. In urban areas,
these transactions costs are evaluated at 81350 in 1994 and at 72004 in 1998 (see columns 3 and
6, respectively)31. These estimates are, a priori, very large given the average observed transfer.
There is however, a potential explanation to these large estimates. To the extent that current
transfers carry future obligations, the transaction costs associated with transfers could be actually
large, which justify the relatively large fraction of corner households32. That is in addition to
the \actual" transaction costs individuals take into account all future discounted obligation costs
associated with current transfer.
31Using estimation results in tables 7 and 8 give similar size of transactions costs
32? and Fiske (1990) work in Burkina provides anecdotal account of the obligations associated with transfers. For
an empirical analysis in di®erent settings, see Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), for example19
For the remaining covariates, I focus on tables 9 and 10 for rural and urban households, respec-
tively. The e®ect of the household head age provides additional support to the connection between
transfer °ows and the household life cycle. The head age and its squared term are jointly signi¯cant,
and the signs imply a U shaped transfer pattern, which is consistent with old-age support role of
transfers. To the extent that household composition may be changing over the household life cycle,
this suggests a possible connection between transfer °ows and the household life cycle. As expected,
there is positive correlation between transfers received and female headship (e.g. Cox and Jimenez,
1992). But as already discussed, the e®ects of household composition and head characteristics must
be interpreted with caution.
The variable ruralresid captures out-migration to other rural regions, and is calculated as the
number of individuals who have migrated from region i to other rural areas divided by the number
of households currently residing in province i. The variable cityresid measures out-migration to
cities. In rural areas (ref. table 9), ruralresid is consistently positive and signi¯cant while cityresid
is negative and only signi¯cant in 1994. The same pattern holds for urban households, although the
the coe±cients are not statistically signi¯cant. This is unexpected since a priori one may anticipate
more transfer °ows from cities to rural areas. However, it is possible that these variables are also
conveying information related to regional economic opportunities. For example, economically more
disadvantaged regions are more likely to supply migrants to other rural regions, and get in turn
more remittances.
5.2 Results from the A-I estimator
Estimated transfer reactions based on the A-I estimator are presented in table 11 for rural house-
holds, and in table 5 for urban households. In each table, transfer reaction to permanent and to
transitory income is shown in columns (1) to (3) and (4) to (6), respectively. Columns (1) and
(2) present transfer response to recipient and donor permanent income, respectively. Column (3)
reports the di®erence between columns (2) and (1), which is an estimate of the transfer response
to a increase in one unit in the recipient income followed by a decrease of one unit in the donor
income, conditional on transfers being received. Corresponding results are presented in columns
(4)-(6) for transitory income, conditional on transfers being given out. Results for 1994 and 1998
are shown in the top and the middle panels, respectively. Estimation results for the pooled sample
are presented in the bottom panel. The derivatives are evaluated at the sample mean and for
each income quartile. The standard errors (reported in brackets for the sample average estimates)
indicate that the coe±cients are precisely estimated for the overall sample. They are less precise,
however when one considers income quartiles.
- Insert table 11 about here.
-Insert table 12 about here.
It is apparent from columns (1) and (2) that transfers are less responsive to changes in recipient20
permanent income than to changes in the donor permanent income, a result which is stable for the
two years and for the pooled sample. This is expected since the donor is likely to have more control
over transfers given than the recipient is over transfers received, and information was available for
only one transfer partner. Looking at column (2), transfer response to permanent income decreases
with income level in 1994 (i.e. immediately after harvest) but increases with income in 1998,
i.e. during the leaning season. While transfer pattern in 1994 is more consistent with altruistic
behavior whereby there is a larger transfer derivative for low income households, transfer derivatives
in 1998 are more consistent with exchange behavior, i.e. increasing with income level. This puzzling
pattern could result from if poor households transfer to rich households immediately after harvest
in order to induce reciprocal gifts during the leaning season. It could also be the other way around:
poor households are paying back implicit loans contracted from rich households during the leaning
season. However, in absence of detailed information on the transfer partners and the timing of the
transfers these results must be interpreted with caution.
Columns (4)-(6) show the transfer reaction to transitory income. It can be seen that transitory
income loss is met with little transfer, on average a decrease of CFA in transitory income is met
with CFA .03 in 1994 and CFA 0.08 in 1998. In contrast, on average CFA .23 and CFA .09 is
given out of each additional CFA of transitory income. For the two years, the fraction of additional
transitory income which is transferred out increases with income level, households in the highest
income group transfer out relatively more transitory income than households in the lowest. There
are noticeable changes between 1994 and 1998 for only the ¯rst and fourth income quartiles.
Estimated transfer derivatives are reported in columns (3) and (6) for permanent and transitory
income, respectively. Suppose that transfers °ow from the fourth to the ¯rst income quartile. The
results imply that if transitory income drops one unit in the fourth quartile and increases one unit
in the ¯rst, then there is a reduction of .48 unit in transfer °ows. Similar changes in permanent
income imply that transfers are reduced by .15 unit, a ¯gure which is close to that reported by
Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko® (1997) for the United States.
Results for urban households are presented in table 12. The ¯rst caveat is that transfer deriv-
atives are much larger than those of rural areas, a result which is consistent with the estimates
presented so far. For the highest income quartile, the hypothesis that public transfers are neu-
tralized by compensatory e®ects of private transfers could not be ruled out. The main fact is
that wealthier households donate more from additional income, suggesting that changes in donor
behavior drives the crowding-out pattern. Note that the crowding e®ect will still hold even if one
assumes that transfers °ow from the highest to the lowest income quartile.
In fact, in 1998 transfer is almost insensitive to permanent income for households in the lowest
quartile. Yet, considering the two years together and keeping in mind the timing of the survey may
suggest another interpretation. It is conceivable that poor households transfer out immediately
after harvest in anticipation of reciprocal gifts from the wealthier later in the slacking season.21
This interpretation is consistent with the idea of induced altruism formalized by Stark and Falk
(2000) and both anthropological (Hammond, 1966) and quantitative (Ellsworth and Shapiro, 1989)
description of transfer patterns in Burkina Faso.
5.3 Partial linear estimations
Estimated transfer responses to income using the partial linear approach are reported in ¯gures 1
to 4, for permanent and transitory income and in rural and urban areas. In each set of ¯gures, the
top panel shows estimates of 1994 and 1998, respectively, and the bottom panel shows estimates
using the pooled sample. In each panel the distribution of the relevant income measure is plotted
against the right-hand side y axis.
- Insert ¯gures 1 and 2 about here
In ¯gure 1, the pattern shows a weak response of transfer to income at low income levels, followed
by a sharp negative response and then a pattern which is close to an inverted U. This last segment
covers, however, a small fraction of the income distribution. In essence, the pattern suggests that
the strongest response of transfers to permanent income occurs only for the middle income group,
a ¯nding which was already suggestive in the parametric estimations. Figure 2 depicts transfer
response to permanent income in urban areas. In contrast to rural areas, the transfer response
monotonically decreases until one reaches high income level (above CFA 232,000 in 1994 and CFA
220,000 in 1998). Thus, for the largest fraction of urban residents, there is strong negative transfer
response to income.
Transfer response to transitory income in rural areas is reported in ¯gure 3. In each year, for
transitory income loss above CF 40,000 there is a sharp negative response of transfer. Above this
threshold, the transfer reaction is rather weak, and becomes substantial when transitory income
gains reach around CFA 55,000. A possible explanation of this pattern is that transfers compensate
transitory income variations only when the loss or the gain reaches a certain threshold; in other
words, there is a range of income shocks within which one may not observe risk-sharing. This will
be the case if only large losses or gains are observed or if households are able to auto-insure against
relatively small shocks. The pattern uncovered for urban households (see 4) is similar to that of
rural households. In each case, however, only a small fraction of the households are subject to
such large shocks. This might explain the weak response of transfers to income uncovered by the
parametric approach.
- Insert 3 and 4 about here
6 Conclusion
This paper sought to describe the extent and pattern of private transfers in Burkina Faso, a
low-income country with virtually no formal public transfer system but with a long tradition of22
gift giving. The data used for the empirical work were from existing household survey datasets
collected in 1994 and 1998. The analysis was concerned with the motives for private transfers and,
in particular, to what extent they would be "crowded out" by public transfers and other government
programs. The paper aimed also to contribute to the econometric analysis of transfer behavior by
using a multifaceted estimation approach.
The empirical work used two national surveys conducted in 1994 and 1998. The estimation
focused on the response of net transfers (measured as transfers received minus transfers given) to
recipient permanent and transitory income. The ¯ndings suggested that transfers °ow primarily
from more a²uent to less a²uent households, implying that private transfers might have some
income equalizing e®ects. There is a signi¯cant and negative relationship between net transfers and
recipient permanent income. The magnitude of the response, however, varies greatly by income
level. It is, in particular insigni¯cant at the lowest income and the most important at the middle
income level. Transfer response to transitory income varies between the two years, although there is
a common pattern which indicates that transfers react only to large income shocks, either positive
or negative, which in each year concern a small fraction of the households.
These ¯ndings have implications on both our understanding of transfer behavior and policies
which seek to in°uence the income distribution, although they must interpreted with caution since
they hinge on the validity of my identi¯cation strategy. The evidence suggests that altruistic
transfers, whereby transfers are reduced if the recipient income increases, are not observed below a
certain income threshold. In other words, for the poorest households, a marginal increase in income
does not in°uence the amount of transfers received. Such transfer pattern suggests that e®ective
public transfers targeting the poorest households are feasible. Transfer response to transitory
income becomes important only if shocks are relatively large. In the wake of the renewed interest
in risk management in Africa (already mentioned), this suggests that crowding out of informal
insurance mechanisms are more likely if outside interventions target large shocks but could be
minimized by targeting moderate shocks which are more common and are less insured through
private transfers.23
References
Alderman, H., and C. H. Paxson (1994): \Do the Poor Insure? A Synthesis of the Literature
on Risk and Consumption in Developing Countries," in Economic in a Changing World, ed.
by E. L. Bacha, vol. Development, Trade and the Environment, chap. 3, pp. 48{78. Macillan,
London.
Altonji, J., F. Hayashi, and F. Kotlikoff (1997): \Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Trans-
fers: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 105(6), 1121{1166.
Altonji, J. G., and H. Ichimura (2000): \Estimating Derivatives in Nonseparable Models with
Limited Dependent Variables," Mimeo.
Ancey, G. (1983): Monnaie et Structure d'Exploitation en Pays Mossi: Haute Volta. Editions de
l'O±ce de la Recherche Scienti¯que et Thechnique Outre-Mer.
Badini, K. F. (2004): \Contrat entre les Generations et Securite Sociale Locale des Personnes
agees en Milieu Rural Burkinabe," Papier Presente a la Conference \Debats Nord-Sud: Relations
de Securite Sociale et Genre", Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso,15-16 Decembre 2003.
Barro, R. J. (1974): \Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, 82(4),
1095{1117.
Becker, G. S. (1974): \A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, 82(4),
1063{1094.
Cochrane, J. H. (1991): \A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 99(5), 957{76.
Cox, D. (1987): \Motives for Private Income Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, 95(3),
508{46.
Cox, D., B. E. Hansen, and E. Jimenez (2004): \How Responsive are Private Transfers to
Income: Evidence from a Laissez-Faire Economy," Journal of Pulic Economics, 88(9-10), 2193{
2219.
Cox, D., and G. Jakubson (1995): \The Connection between Public Transfers and Private
Interfamily Transfers," Journal of Public Economics, 57(1), 129{67.
Cox, D., and E. Jimenez (1992): \Social Security and Private Transfers in Developing Countries:
The Case of Peru," World Bank Economic Review, 6(1), 155{69.24
(1995): \Private Transfers and the E®ectiveness of Public Income Redistribution in the
Philippines," in Public spending and the poor: Theory and evidence, ed. by D. van de Walle,
and K. Nead, pp. 321{46. Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, Baltimore and
London.
Cox, D., and M. R. Rank (1992): \Inter-vivos Transfers and Intergenerational Exchange,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, 74(2), 305{14.
Ellsworth, L., and K. Shapiro (1989): \Seasonality in Burkina Faso Grain Marketing: Farmer
Strategies and Government Policies," in Seasonal Variability in Third Wordl Agriculture, ed. by
D. E. Sahn. Jonh Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Fafchamps, M., C. Udry, and K. Czukas (1998): \Drought and Saving in West Africa: Are
Livestock a Bu®er Stock?," Journal of Development Economics, 55(2), 273{305.
Fan, J. (1992): \Design-Adaptative Nonparametric Regression," Journal of the American Statis-
tical Association, 97, 998{1004.
Fiske, A. P. (1990): \Relativity within the Moose (\Mossi") Culture: Four Incomensurable
Modelss for Social Relationships," Ethos, 18(2), 180{204.
Foster, A. D., and M. R. Rosenzweig (2001): \Imperfect Commitment, Altruism, and the
Family: Evidence from Transfer Behavior in Low-Income Rural Areas," Review of Economics
and Statistics, 83(3), 389{407.
Greene, W. (1997): Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, USA, 3 edn.
Hammond, P. (1966): Yatenga: Thechnology in the Culture of a West African Kingdom. The Free
Press, New York.
Harragin, S. (2004): \Relief and Understanding of Local Knowledge: The Case of Southern
Sudan," in Culture and Public Action, ed. by V. Rao, and M. Walton, chap. 14, pp. 307{327.
Stanford University Press.
Honore, B. E., E. Kyriazidou, and C. Udry (1997): \Estimation of Type 3 Tobit Models
using Symmetric and Pairwise Comparisons," Journal of Econometrics, 75, 107{128.
Kazianga, H., and C. Udry (2004): \Consumption Smoothing and Livestock in Rural Burkina
Faso," Paper Presented at Center for the Study of African Economies Annual Meeting, March
21-22 , University of Oxford, UK.
Lucas, R. E. B., and O. Stark (1985): \Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Bostwana,"
Journal of Political Economy, 93(5), 901{918.25
Mace (1991): \Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty," Journal of Political
Economy, 99(5), 928{956.
Maddala, G. S. (1983): Limited-Dependant and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. Cam-
bridge University Press, New York, 1 edn.
Mahieu, F. R. (2000): \Altruism and Poverty in an African Context," in The Economics of
Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, ed. by L. A. Gerard-Varet, S. C. Kolm, and J. M. Ythier,
chap. 10, pp. 196{203. MacMillan Press.
Nicholson, S. E., and I. M. Paolo (1993): \A Re-Evaluation of Rainfall Variability in the
Sahel. Part I. Characteristics of Rainfall Fluctuations," International Journal of Climatology,
13(4), 371{389.
Paxson, C. H. (1992): \Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Saving to Tran-
sitory Income in Thailand," American Economic Review, 82(1), 15{33.
Ravallion, M. (2003): \Targeted Transfers in Poor Countries: Revisiting the Trade-O®s and
Policy Options," Social Protection Discussion Paper Series 314, Social Protection Unit, Human
Development Network, The World Bank, Washington, DC. USA.
Riesman, P. (1974): Societe et Liberte chez les Peul Djelgobe de Haute Volta: Essai
d'Anthropologie Introspective. Mouton and Co. et Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris,
France.
Robinson, P. M. (1988): \Root-N-Consistent Semiparametric Regression," Econometrica, 56(4),
931{954.
Rosenzweig, M. R., and K. I. Wolpin (2000): \Natural Natural Experiments in Economics,"
Journal of Economics Litterature, 38(4), 827{874.
Rosett, R. (1959): \A Statistical Model of Friction in Economics," Econometrica, 27(1), 263{267.
Saul, M. (1981): \Beer, Sorghum and Women: Production for the Market in Rural Upper Volta,"
Africa, 6(3), 746{764.
(1983): \Work Parties, Wages, and Accumulation in a Voltaic Village," American Eth-
nologist, 10(1), 77{96.
Shipton, P. (1990): \African Famines and Food Security: Anthropological Perspectives," Annual
Review of Anthropology, 19, 353{394.26
Stark, O., and I. Falk (2000): \Transfers, Empathy Formation, and Reverse Transfers," in The
Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, ed. by L. A. Gerard-Varet, S. C. Kolm, and J. M.
Ythier, chap. 8, pp. 174{181. MacMillan Press.
Townsend, R. M. (1994): \Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, 62(3), 539{91.
Udry, C. (1994): \Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in
Northern Nigeria," Review of Economic Studies, 61, 495{526.
(1996): \Gender, Agricultural Production and the Theory of the Household," Journal of
Political Economy, 104(5), 1010{1046.
Varet-Gerard, L. A., S. C. Kolm, and J. M. Ythier (eds.) (2000): The Economics of
Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, no. 130 in International Economic Association Conference.
MacMillan Press.
World Bank (2001): \Dynamic Risk Management and the Poor: Developing a Social Protection
Strategy for Africa," Report 28144-BUR, Africa Region Human Development Department, The
World Bank, Washington, D. C., USA.
(2004): \Burkina Faso Risk and Vulnerability Assessment," Report, Africa Region Human
Development Department, The World Bank, Washington, D. C., USA.
Yatchew, A. (2003): Semiparametric Regression for the Applied Econometrician. Cambridge
University Press, New York.27
Table 1: Household participation in transfers, 1994 and 1998
(1) 2 3 4
Rural Urban
1994 1998 1994 1998
Non participants 61.72 57.4 59.6 56.47
As recipients only 23.01 27.59 12.54 17.01
As donors only 8.35 9.02 21.85 20.86
As both 6.92 5.99 6.01 5.67
Number households 4956 5465 2193 226728
Table 2: Monthly distribution of transfer given
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Frequency Transfer size t-test N
Rural
1994 15.27 2922.28 5003
October 11.11 2191.49 0.68 207
November 16.12 3759.10 1.70 1526
December 14.86 2178.10 2.32 1686
January 15.43 3005.26 0.19 1581
1998 15.01 3047.60 5523
May 11.61 2658.28 0.80 1266
June 17.09 3111.39 0.20 2130
July 14.95 3215.43 0.50 2127
Urban
1994 27.86 7976.89 2144
October 30.53 6734.12 1.02 237
November 34.76 9818.82 2.49 708
December 22.97 6434.51 2.55 838
January 24.02 8782.80 0.63 361
1998 26.53 8119.76 2278
May 26.03 7909.75 0.29 646
June 26.22 8168.47 0.07 677
July 28.04 8145.02 0.04 818
August 21.32 8718.48 0.29 13729
Table 3: Transfer impact on household income, rural areas
Income Net Transfer Perc. income
Pre-transfer Post-transfer
1994
Non Participants 36034 36034 0 0.00
Recipients 31601 39915 8314 26.31
Donors 70066 56482 -13585 -19.39
Both recipients and donors 68105 67405 -699 -1.03
1st quartile 26761 28168 1407 5.26
2nd quartile 29104 30734 1630 5.60
3rd quartile 36982 38244 1262 3.41
4th quartile 67704 66193 -1511 -2.23
1998
Non Participants 58509 58509 0.0 0.00
Recipients 42874 51190 8316.4 19.40
Donors 100428 84513 -15915.2 -15.85
Both recipients and donors 75190 74144 -1045.4 -1.39
1st quartile 36162 38801 2639 7.30
2nd quartile 47855 49969 2114 4.42
3rd quartile 59768 61694 1926 3.22
4th quartile 92159 88654 -3505 -3.8030
Table 4: Transfer impact on household income, urban areas
Income Net Transfer Perc. income
Pre-transfer Post-transfer
1994
Non Participants 136395 136395 0 0.00
Recipients 92250 106190 13940 15.11
Donors 190203 178470 -11734 -6.17
Both recipients and donors 158408 164208 5801 3.66
1st quartile 51001 53210 2209 4.33
2nd quartile 95363 96538 1175 1.23
3rd quartile 148191 148734 543 0.37
4th quartile 262038 260111 -1927 -0.74
1998
Non Participants 148859 148859 0.0 0.00
Recipients 94879 110161 15281.7 16.11
Donors 172355 158944 -13411.0 -7.78
Both recipients and donors 221612 223578 1966.2 0.89
1st quartile 54651 57986 3335 6.10
2nd quartile 95623 98213 2590 2.71
3rd quartile 140363 142196 -5471 -3.90
4th quartile 287290 284759 -2532 -0.8831
Table 5: Transfers e®ects on income distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Theil
Point estimate Sd. Error Point estimate Sd. Error
Rural
Pre-transfer income
1994 0.571 0.011 0.621 0.029
1998 0.497 0.009 0.449 0.021
Post-transfer income
1994 0.555 0.011 0.585 0.03
1998 0.474 0.009 0.408 0.019
Urban
Pre-transfer income
1994 0.513 0.012 0.446 0.023
1998 0.489 0.012 0.403 0.021
Post-transfer income
1994 0.506 0.011 0.433 0.021
1998 0.477 0.012 0.384 0.02532
Table 6: Monte Carlo evaluation of omitted variable bias
Cov(Id;Ir) = 0 Cov(Id;Ir) = :25
Sample size OLS Tobit Rosett OLS Tobit Rosett
100 -0.302 -0.333 -0.379 -0.226 -0.250 -0.286
[.107] [.124] [.141] [.107] [.122] [.141]
[.085] [.101] [.129] [.104] [.105] [.112]
1000 -0.302 -0.333 -0.378 -0.227 -0.251 -0.286
[.033] [.038] [.043] [.033] [.038] [.043]
[.026] [.042] [.0795] [.073] [.052] [.036]
10000 -0.299 -0.330 -0.374 -0.224 -0.248 -0.281
[.010] [.012] [.013] [.011] [.012] [.014]
[.008] [.030] [.074] [.076] [.052] [.019]33
Table7:Transferresponsetoincomeinruralareas
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*
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*
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.
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]
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.
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8
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.
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.
8
1
9
-
1
0
3
5
1
.
0
0
0
-
4
5
6
7
.
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.
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-
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8
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9
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.
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.
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.
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.
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n
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o
m
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.
3
.
4
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.
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.
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.
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.
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3
3
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.
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.
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.
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3
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0
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.
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3
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b
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Table8:Transferresponsetoincome,urbanareas
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1
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(
2
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(
3
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(
4
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(
5
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(
6
)
(
7
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9
)
(
1
0
)
(
1
1
)
(
1
2
)
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
4
/
1
9
9
8
S
p
l
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n
e
S
p
l
i
n
e
w
.
f
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
S
p
l
i
n
e
S
p
l
i
n
e
w
.
f
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
S
p
l
i
n
e
S
p
l
i
n
e
w
.
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r
i
c
t
i
o
n
I
n
c
.
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n
s
t
.
I
n
c
.
i
n
s
t
.
I
n
c
.
i
n
s
t
.
I
n
c
.
i
n
s
t
.
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n
c
.
i
n
s
t
.
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n
c
.
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n
s
t
.
1
s
t
q
u
a
r
t
i
l
e
-
0
.
0
7
4
0
.
0
0
6
-
0
.
3
4
0
-
0
.
0
6
6
-
0
.
1
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5
-
0
.
0
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6
-
0
.
3
6
6
-
0
.
1
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-
0
.
1
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-
0
.
0
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-
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.
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-
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.
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.
1
7
]
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.
1
5
]
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2
.
5
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.
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.
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.
1
7
]
*
*
[
4
.
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*
*
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.
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]
*
*
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*
*
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1
.
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5
.
4
4
]
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*
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2
.
8
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*
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d
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e
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0
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2
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0
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0
0
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-
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-
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0
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0
2
2
-
0
.
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-
0
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0
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7
0
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-
0
.
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0
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-
0
.
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-
0
.
0
8
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.
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2
]
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0
.
0
0
]
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2
.
2
2
]
*
*
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1
.
3
7
]
[
0
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2
]
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0
.
6
8
]
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1
.
2
5
]
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1
.
4
7
]
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5
.
5
1
]
*
*
*
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0
.
3
8
]
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3
.
6
2
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*
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.
6
1
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r
d
q
u
a
r
t
i
l
e
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9
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-
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-
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-
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-
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.
2
8
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4
.
6
1
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*
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.
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]
*
*
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.
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*
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2
.
8
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*
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9
.
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*
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4
.
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6
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*
*
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.
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*
*
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.
8
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1
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.
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*
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.
4
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.
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t
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0
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4
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0
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3
-
0
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0
1
6
-
0
.
0
4
3
-
0
.
0
4
8
-
0
.
0
6
1
-
0
.
0
9
0
-
0
.
0
4
5
-
0
.
0
4
0
-
0
.
0
6
7
-
0
.
0
6
6
[
7
.
7
9
]
*
*
*
[
0
.
8
1
]
[
5
.
6
1
]
*
*
*
[
0
.
4
0
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7
.
6
0
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*
*
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3
.
0
3
]
*
*
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.
3
7
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*
*
[
2
.
8
3
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[
1
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.
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.
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.
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*
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.
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1
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0
1
4
2
6
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2
.
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7
5
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1
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.
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1
7
1
1
0
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.
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1
2
1
0
9
8
0
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2
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0
.
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]
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0
.
9
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]
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1
.
1
3
]
[
0
.
8
3
]
[
0
.
0
8
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[
0
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0
1
]
[
0
.
9
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]
[
0
.
8
1
]
[
0
.
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]
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0
.
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.
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*
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.
5
5
]
G
i
r
l
s
6
-
1
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8
9
8
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4
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-
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1
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.
7
3
5
-
1
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1
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.
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1
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4
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1
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5
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1
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1
.
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.
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.
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2
.
0
6
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.
3
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.
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.
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.
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0
]
[
1
.
2
3
]
[
1
.
0
8
]
[
1
.
0
8
]
[
1
.
2
5
]
[
1
.
1
7
]
M
e
n
1
6
-
6
4
-
9
8
4
1
.
6
8
2
-
7
4
4
7
.
7
5
5
8
4
3
1
.
3
6
6
6
8
6
0
.
9
1
3
2
0
9
0
1
.
6
1
2
2
9
3
6
3
.
4
0
8
6
8
5
3
4
.
8
8
0
8
3
2
4
3
.
0
0
0
7
3
1
7
.
9
1
8
1
4
2
9
1
.
2
0
6
3
9
5
2
9
.
3
1
6
5
9
8
2
5
.
0
2
8
[
1
.
0
7
]
[
0
.
7
2
]
[
0
.
7
0
]
[
0
.
2
8
]
[
2
.
5
7
]
*
*
[
3
.
4
0
]
*
*
*
[
6
.
2
1
]
*
*
*
[
6
.
4
6
]
*
*
*
[
1
.
2
1
]
[
2
.
2
0
]
*
*
[
3
.
1
4
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
3
6
]
*
*
*
W
o
m
e
n
1
6
-
6
4
-
5
3
9
0
.
6
5
0
-
2
9
6
1
.
2
0
0
2
2
0
2
0
.
5
6
0
1
9
4
7
7
.
6
3
7
2
2
7
0
1
.
9
1
4
2
7
8
7
8
.
2
2
9
6
7
7
0
1
.
3
7
0
7
3
7
6
0
.
5
7
9
1
0
6
4
8
.
9
7
2
1
5
0
5
5
.
4
6
1
4
4
9
4
6
.
4
1
4
5
7
9
3
4
.
4
8
5
[
0
.
5
8
]
[
0
.
3
0
]
[
1
.
8
0
]
*
[
0
.
8
2
]
[
2
.
7
8
]
*
*
*
[
3
.
2
3
]
*
*
*
[
6
.
3
2
]
*
*
*
[
6
.
1
3
]
*
*
*
[
1
.
7
5
]
*
[
2
.
3
4
]
*
*
[
3
.
5
2
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
2
5
]
*
*
*
M
e
n
6
5
+
1
7
4
1
.
2
6
5
8
5
2
2
.
9
9
5
5
2
5
0
6
.
0
3
8
5
9
4
5
9
.
3
0
6
2
1
8
4
3
.
0
6
5
3
3
3
1
7
.
5
1
7
7
5
3
3
6
.
7
9
3
9
5
8
3
0
.
4
8
9
1
1
6
3
0
.
0
7
2
2
1
9
7
2
.
6
3
8
5
7
0
4
9
.
4
6
3
8
5
0
0
0
.
8
6
5
[
0
.
1
2
]
[
0
.
5
3
]
[
1
.
8
7
]
*
[
1
.
6
3
]
[
1
.
8
4
]
*
[
2
.
6
7
]
*
*
*
[
3
.
6
9
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
2
9
]
*
*
*
[
1
.
2
6
]
[
2
.
2
5
]
*
*
[
2
.
9
2
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
0
9
]
*
*
*
M
e
n
6
5
+
6
9
0
0
.
5
4
4
8
1
1
3
.
5
6
7
5
2
6
2
6
.
9
7
9
4
9
7
4
0
.
3
5
1
2
1
1
6
5
.
6
0
1
2
8
3
3
2
.
3
1
9
6
3
7
5
4
.
0
5
8
6
9
4
7
7
.
9
6
0
1
4
4
9
2
.
4
7
1
2
1
3
7
6
.
6
2
8
5
4
2
5
1
.
7
5
8
7
2
2
4
5
.
1
3
1
[
0
.
5
1
]
[
0
.
5
7
]
[
2
.
2
2
]
*
*
[
1
.
5
2
]
[
2
.
0
4
]
*
*
[
2
.
5
7
]
*
*
[
4
.
1
9
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
1
6
]
*
*
*
[
1
.
8
0
]
*
[
2
.
5
3
]
*
*
[
3
.
2
2
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
0
5
]
*
*
*
h
h
.
S
i
z
e
-
5
2
.
7
3
4
3
0
0
.
5
3
0
-
4
1
4
.
3
3
2
3
9
7
.
1
3
1
-
2
6
5
.
2
4
8
4
6
4
.
8
4
2
-
8
9
9
.
6
8
5
5
5
0
.
7
3
6
-
1
2
8
.
1
3
5
3
7
1
.
7
1
7
-
5
7
8
.
9
6
3
5
4
1
.
4
0
5
[
0
.
3
3
]
[
1
.
8
0
]
*
[
1
.
2
3
]
[
1
.
1
2
]
[
1
.
4
4
]
[
2
.
4
2
]
*
*
[
2
.
4
3
]
*
*
[
1
.
4
0
]
[
1
.
0
9
]
[
3
.
0
1
]
*
*
*
[
2
.
3
6
]
*
*
[
2
.
0
9
]
*
*
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
/
A
d
u
l
t
-
2
8
1
7
.
4
8
0
-
1
2
3
3
.
9
6
0
5
2
9
0
.
6
9
4
6
3
6
4
.
5
6
7
6
6
0
8
.
5
7
9
8
9
1
9
.
2
4
2
1
8
7
3
5
.
5
5
8
2
2
0
8
6
.
0
1
4
2
2
0
9
.
9
8
1
4
0
5
7
.
8
6
1
1
1
0
1
2
.
5
2
9
1
6
3
4
4
.
6
5
1
[
0
.
8
3
]
[
0
.
3
4
]
[
0
.
9
7
]
[
0
.
7
6
]
[
2
.
0
7
]
*
*
[
2
.
6
5
]
*
*
*
[
3
.
8
2
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
0
8
]
*
*
*
[
0
.
9
6
]
[
1
.
6
7
]
*
[
2
.
3
0
]
*
*
[
3
.
2
0
]
*
*
*
A
g
e
h
h
.
h
e
a
d
-
3
4
3
.
9
0
3
-
4
8
7
.
7
4
0
-
6
0
4
.
2
4
5
-
1
1
0
5
.
4
6
3
1
1
4
.
4
1
8
-
3
5
.
3
0
9
2
9
8
.
9
3
1
-
1
5
7
.
1
1
8
-
5
9
.
0
4
1
-
2
0
0
.
6
8
0
-
1
5
5
.
6
9
4
-
4
5
5
.
6
5
336
[
1
.
4
0
]
[
1
.
8
7
]
*
[
1
.
3
8
]
[
1
.
8
7
]
*
[
0
.
5
5
]
[
0
.
1
6
]
[
0
.
8
4
]
[
0
.
4
1
]
[
0
.
3
7
]
[
1
.
2
0
]
[
0
.
4
7
]
[
1
.
3
0
]
A
g
e
h
h
h
e
a
d
s
q
.
3
0
2
.
1
0
9
4
4
5
.
0
7
6
5
6
0
.
2
2
4
1
0
1
0
.
2
3
1
-
3
8
.
1
1
8
6
6
.
9
0
9
-
1
1
0
.
6
7
5
2
4
4
.
6
6
2
9
4
.
3
0
8
1
9
4
.
7
6
5
2
3
0
.
4
9
0
4
2
4
.
0
3
1
[
1
.
1
7
]
[
1
.
6
1
]
[
1
.
1
6
]
[
1
.
6
5
]
*
[
0
.
1
8
]
[
0
.
2
9
]
[
0
.
2
9
]
[
0
.
6
0
]
[
0
.
5
7
]
[
1
.
1
1
]
[
0
.
6
7
]
[
1
.
1
5
]
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
(
y
r
s
)
-
1
6
9
.
8
8
5
-
3
4
3
.
5
0
8
-
7
.
1
2
1
-
3
9
1
.
8
3
1
-
3
.
2
3
2
-
1
.
2
4
3
-
4
.
7
2
2
-
5
.
0
0
3
-
2
9
.
7
2
3
-
2
8
.
8
0
0
-
4
0
.
7
2
2
-
4
0
.
9
0
2
[
1
.
0
7
]
[
1
.
6
1
]
[
0
.
0
2
]
[
0
.
8
7
]
[
0
.
0
6
]
[
0
.
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
4
]
[
0
.
5
4
]
[
0
.
4
7
]
[
0
.
3
5
]
[
0
.
3
1
]
M
a
l
e
h
e
a
d
-
2
6
8
5
.
3
5
8
-
3
5
1
8
.
9
4
3
-
9
6
5
4
.
5
1
0
-
1
2
3
1
9
.
0
0
0
-
4
3
8
0
.
8
7
2
-
7
0
5
0
.
8
7
4
-
1
4
5
3
0
.
2
0
0
-
2
1
0
0
2
.
7
0
0
-
4
2
4
3
.
5
7
1
-
5
6
5
4
.
2
6
6
-
1
3
2
4
4
.
1
0
0
-
1
6
9
7
1
.
4
0
0
[
1
.
3
8
]
[
1
.
7
2
]
*
[
2
.
3
6
]
*
*
[
2
.
7
9
]
*
*
*
[
2
.
7
2
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
1
3
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
5
1
]
*
*
*
[
6
.
1
1
]
*
*
*
[
3
.
4
4
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
3
3
]
*
*
*
[
5
.
1
4
]
*
*
*
[
6
.
1
6
]
*
*
*
r
u
r
a
l
r
e
s
i
d
-
7
7
5
.
5
4
7
-
5
2
3
.
4
7
0
2
1
4
8
5
.
9
7
8
2
1
3
1
8
.
6
0
8
1
3
9
7
5
.
4
3
5
8
4
3
1
.
6
0
6
2
6
3
3
7
.
6
1
7
1
8
8
6
5
.
4
9
2
-
1
7
8
3
.
4
4
6
-
7
2
1
.
1
1
0
-
9
1
2
7
.
0
4
7
-
6
3
4
8
.
0
4
6
[
0
.
1
0
]
[
0
.
0
7
]
[
1
.
3
6
]
[
1
.
2
8
]
[
1
.
2
6
]
[
0
.
7
2
]
[
1
.
1
9
]
[
0
.
8
0
]
[
0
.
5
1
]
[
0
.
2
0
]
[
1
.
2
6
]
[
0
.
8
2
]
c
i
t
y
r
e
s
i
d
3
3
5
2
.
7
3
5
2
2
6
2
.
8
8
9
-
1
9
3
6
5
.
3
0
0
-
2
4
6
6
2
.
8
0
0
-
4
7
6
6
0
.
6
0
0
-
4
1
1
3
8
.
4
0
0
-
6
4
7
8
9
.
9
0
0
-
6
0
0
6
8
.
8
0
0
3
2
1
.
8
5
1
-
3
2
0
6
.
8
8
3
1
2
5
5
1
.
0
6
7
3
0
6
9
.
9
7
1
[
0
.
2
7
]
[
0
.
1
7
]
[
0
.
7
8
]
[
0
.
9
4
]
[
1
.
7
6
]
*
[
1
.
4
4
]
[
1
.
2
0
]
[
1
.
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
4
]
[
0
.
4
0
]
[
0
.
7
9
]
[
0
.
1
8
]
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
2
9
2
3
4
.
3
5
9
2
1
7
7
2
.
4
7
9
2
9
8
.
7
4
9
2
9
8
.
1
6
9
-
9
5
3
9
.
9
5
8
-
1
6
5
1
9
.
3
0
0
0
.
1
7
1
0
.
0
0
8
6
0
0
4
.
3
7
9
4
8
8
.
7
5
2
1
7
3
.
3
8
0
1
9
1
.
4
0
4
[
2
.
3
8
]
*
*
[
1
.
7
1
]
*
[
0
.
8
8
]
[
1
.
4
1
]
[
0
.
7
6
]
[
0
.
0
6
]
F
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
c
o
e
f
.
-
8
1
7
4
7
.
4
1
0
-
8
4
3
1
0
.
9
2
0
-
0
.
0
2
9
0
.
0
0
0
-
1
4
9
2
0
.
9
4
0
-
1
9
6
7
4
.
0
8
0
[
7
.
4
7
]
*
*
*
[
7
.
1
7
]
*
*
*
[
.
0
0
]
[
.
0
0
]
[
.
9
2
]
[
1
.
1
3
]
F
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
c
o
e
f
.
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
7
2
3
2
5
.
2
6
0
7
4
6
1
1
.
3
5
0
4
9
1
5
4
.
5
6
0
4
6
4
0
9
.
3
1
0
[
.
0
0
]
[
.
0
0
]
[
6
.
9
8
]
*
*
*
[
6
.
7
4
]
*
*
*
[
3
.
0
1
]
*
*
*
[
2
.
6
6
]
*
*
*
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
2
1
9
3
2
1
9
3
2
1
9
3
2
1
9
3
2
2
6
7
2
2
6
7
2
2
6
7
2
2
6
7
4
4
6
0
4
4
6
0
4
4
6
0
4
4
6
0
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
2
3
0
.
1
4
0
.
2
0
0
.
1
1
0
.
2
1
0
.
1
2
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
i
n
c
o
m
e
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
1
.
1
6
3
.
1
6
2
2
.
9
2
6
.
8
6
1
1
.
6
0
1
.
7
7
5
5
.
2
8
5
.
4
6
1
0
.
8
4
5
.
5
6
6
8
.
3
1
1
6
.
0
1
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
i
n
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
*
s
i
g
n
i
¯
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
;
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
¯
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
*
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
¯
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%37
Table9:Transferresponsetopermanentandtransitoryincomeinruralareas
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
4
/
1
9
9
8
P
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t
i
n
c
o
m
e
-
0
.
1
4
3
-
0
.
1
4
5
-
0
.
1
2
0
-
0
.
1
1
3
-
0
.
1
3
0
-
0
.
1
2
9
[
6
.
7
9
]
*
*
*
[
6
.
8
2
]
*
*
*
[
9
.
3
4
]
*
*
*
[
8
.
4
9
]
*
*
*
[
1
1
.
9
7
]
*
*
*
[
1
1
.
5
7
]
*
*
*
1
s
t
q
u
a
r
t
i
l
e
-
0
.
0
7
5
-
0
.
0
3
7
-
0
.
0
5
4
[
1
.
2
0
]
[
0
.
7
1
]
[
1
.
3
6
]
2
n
d
q
u
a
r
t
i
l
e
-
0
.
2
4
5
-
0
.
2
0
0
-
0
.
2
2
7
[
3
.
2
6
]
*
*
*
[
2
.
7
3
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
3
1
]
*
*
*
3
r
d
q
u
a
r
t
i
l
e
-
0
.
1
5
9
-
0
.
2
3
5
-
0
.
1
7
4
[
2
.
5
9
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
3
9
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
3
6
]
*
*
*
4
t
h
q
u
a
r
t
i
l
e
-
0
.
1
4
0
-
0
.
0
6
1
-
0
.
0
9
1
[
4
.
2
1
]
*
*
*
[
2
.
5
8
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
7
7
]
*
*
*
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
o
r
y
i
n
c
o
m
e
-
0
.
0
4
8
-
0
.
1
7
4
-
0
.
1
2
6
[
2
.
9
9
]
*
*
*
[
1
2
.
5
4
]
*
*
*
[
1
1
.
7
8
]
*
*
*
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
t
r
.
i
n
c
o
m
e
-
0
.
0
4
1
-
0
.
0
4
1
-
0
.
1
9
5
-
0
.
1
9
3
-
0
.
1
2
8
-
0
.
1
2
7
[
2
.
2
2
]
*
*
[
2
.
2
3
]
*
*
[
1
1
.
0
4
]
*
*
*
[
1
0
.
9
6
]
*
*
*
[
1
0
.
0
0
]
*
*
*
[
9
.
9
5
]
*
*
*
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
t
r
.
i
n
c
o
m
e
-
0
.
0
8
0
-
0
.
0
7
7
-
0
.
1
1
7
-
0
.
1
0
0
-
0
.
1
1
8
-
0
.
1
0
6
[
1
.
6
1
]
[
1
.
5
5
]
[
3
.
5
0
]
*
*
*
[
2
.
9
3
]
*
*
*
[
4
.
2
7
]
*
*
*
[
3
.
7
5
]
*
*
*
U
n
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
i
n
c
o
m
e
-
0
.
0
1
8
-
0
.
0
1
9
-
0
.
0
1
9
-
0
.
0
4
1
-
0
.
0
4
0
-
0
.
0
4
0
-
0
.
0
3
0
-
0
.
0
3
0
-
0
.
0
3
0
[
3
.
8
1
]
*
*
*
[
3
.
8
5
]
*
*
*
[
3
.
9
4
]
*
*
*
[
9
.
6
0
]
*
*
*
[
9
.
5
5
]
*
*
*
[
9
.
4
8
]
*
*
*
[
9
.
2
1
]
*
*
*
[
9
.
2
1
]
*
*
*
[
9
.
3
0
]
*
*
*
B
o
y
s
6
-
1
1
2
7
6
.
1
5
9
1
6
5
.
8
8
8
8
4
.
2
1
2
-
3
1
8
2
.
4
6
8
-
3
0
4
6
.
8
2
5
-
3
0
1
6
.
9
1
7
-
2
2
8
9
.
3
7
4
-
2
2
7
0
.
7
2
4
-
2
3
6
0
.
0
9
8
[
0
.
1
4
]
[
0
.
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
4
]
[
1
.
5
6
]
[
1
.
4
9
]
[
1
.
4
7
]
[
1
.
5
8
]
[
1
.
5
7
]
[
1
.
6
3
]
G
i
r
l
s
6
-
1
1
-
4
9
0
2
.
9
2
8
-
5
0
7
3
.
6
7
4
-
5
3
1
6
.
6
7
7
-
7
7
2
.
0
9
2
-
4
8
7
.
4
5
9
-
3
1
7
.
1
3
5
-
2
5
3
4
.
9
1
3
-
2
4
9
4
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Table10:Transferresponsetopermanentandtransitoryincomeinurbanareas
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Table 11: Transfer derivatives implied by AI estimator: rural areas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Permanent income Transitory income
@T
@Ir
@T
@Id (2)-(3) @T
@Ir
@T
@Id (5)-(4)
1994
Sample average -0.078 0.263 0.341 -0.028 0.228 0.256
[0.081] [0.093] [0.118] [0.032] [0.086] [0.093]
1st quartile -0.093 0.276 0.370 -0.019 0.197 0.216
[0.100] [0.134] [0.150] [0.035] [0.087] [0.092]
2nd quartile -0.071 0.235 0.306 -0.027 0.267 0.294
[0.090] [0.094] [0.124] [0.034] [0.082] [0.090]
3rd quartile -0.080 0.228 0.308 -0.039 0.245 0.284
[0.090] [0.088] [0.126] [0.040] [0.090] [0.102]
4th quartile -0.054 0.198 0.251 -0.026 0.283 0.309
[0.079] [0.095] [0.125] [0.053] [0.119] [0.130]
1998
Sample average -0.077 0.132 0.209 -0.079 0.089 0.167
[0.025] [0.050] [0.056] [0.022] [0.036] [0.042]
1st quartile -0.058 0.034 0.092 -0.078 0.056 0.134
[0.044] [0.070] [0.083] [0.024] [0.042] [0.048]
2nd quartile -0.090 0.112 0.202 -0.085 0.058 0.143
[0.031] [0.051] [0.060] [0.023] [0.034] [0.042]
3rd quartile -0.087 0.146 0.233 -0.074 0.074 0.148
[0.027] [0.048] [0.055] [0.027] [0.035] [0.046]
4th quartile -0.113 0.238 0.352 -0.088 0.155 0.243
[0.031] [0.058] [0.065] [0.026] [0.052] [0.058]
1994 and 1998
Sample average -0.051 0.137 0.188 -0.060 0.168 0.228
[0.020] [0.033] [0.041] [0.028] [0.048] [0.057]
1st quartile -0.039 0.124 0.163 -0.056 0.155 0.211
[0.032] [0.048] [0.059] [0.029] [0.051] [0.061]
2nd quartile -0.042 0.114 0.157 -0.055 0.167 0.222
[0.023] [0.033] [0.042] [0.029] [0.050] [0.060]
3rd quartile -0.061 0.111 0.171 -0.067 0.161 0.227
[0.022] [0.030] [0.040] [0.030] [0.047] [0.058]
4th quartile -0.079 0.143 0.222 -0.074 0.189 0.263
[0.026] [0.036] [0.046] [0.034] [0.051] [0.062]
Standard errors are from bootstrap technique (500 simulations) are reported in brackets.42
Table 12: Transfer derivatives implied by AI estimator: urban areas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Permanent income Transitory income
@T
@Ir
@T
@Id (2)-(1) @T
@Ir
@T
@Id (5)-(4)
1994
Sample average -0.0281 0.2201 0.2482 -0.076 0.270 0.346
[0.056] [0.061] [0.087] [0.087] [0.068] [0.115]
1st quartile -0.0448 0.2270 0.2718 -0.018 0.154 0.173
[0.099] [0.088] [0.141] [0.044] [0.039] [0.060]
2nd quartile -0.0531 0.2108 0.2639 -0.073 0.211 0.285
[0.065] [0.053] [0.087] [0.073] [0.049] [0.091]
3rd quartile -0.0178 0.2389 0.2567 -0.123 0.306 0.429
[0.054] [0.052] [0.077] [0.129] [0.073] [0.152]
4th quartile 0.0127 0.2254 0.2126 -0.144 0.459 0.603
[0.063] [0.077] [0.099] [0.168] [0.123] [0.220]
1998
Sample average -0.067 0.299 0.366 -0.088 0.469 0.557
[0.033] [0.039] [0.051] [0.080] [0.070] [0.107]
1st quartile -0.074 0.227 0.301 -0.050 0.352 0.402
[0.064] [0.055] [0.083] [0.043] [0.056] [0.071]
2nd quartile -0.104 0.276 0.381 -0.091 0.391 0.483
[0.037] [0.037] [0.053] [0.088] [0.057] [0.105]
3rd quartile -0.069 0.276 0.345 -0.113 0.460 0.574
[0.037] [0.031] [0.049] [0.108] [0.072] [0.128]
4th quartile 0.001 0.207 0.206 -0.184 0.438 0.621
[0.046] [0.046] [0.062] [0.163] [0.106] [0.200]
1994 and 1998
Sample average -0.021 0.287 0.308 -0.083 0.341 0.425
[0.023] [0.029] [0.036] [0.043] [0.044] [0.065]
1st quartile -0.041 0.189 0.230 -0.048 0.239 0.287
[0.043] [0.038] [0.055] [0.023] [0.029] [0.040]
2nd quartile -0.041 0.235 0.276 -0.088 0.288 0.376
[0.025] [0.026] [0.035] [0.041] [0.036] [0.058]
3rd quartile -0.015 0.277 0.292 -0.114 0.357 0.471
[0.021] [0.028] [0.033] [0.062] [0.045] [0.080]
4th quartile 0.033 0.183 0.150 -0.127 0.434 0.561
[0.028] [0.038] [0.049] [0.079] [0.064] [0.105]
Standard errors are from bootstrap technique (500 simulations) are reported in brackets.43
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Figure 1: Transfer response to permanent income in rural areas44
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Figure 2: Transfer response to permanent income in urban areas45
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Figure 3: Transfer response to transitory income in rural areas46
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Figure 4: Transfer response to transitory income in urban areas47
Appendices
A descriptive statistics48
Table 13: Summary of variables used in estimations, rural sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
variable mean st. deviation min max
1994
Net transfers 664.289 17476.780 -444444.400 545454.600
Pre-transfer income 40869.470 67068.610 1002.476 978154.800
boys, 6-11 0.128 0.152 0.000 1.000
girls, 6-11 0.112 0.143 0.000 1.500
boys, 12-15 0.041 0.078 0.000 0.500
girls, 12-15 0.039 0.079 0.000 1.000
men, 15-64 0.316 0.173 0.000 1.000
women, 15-64 0.350 0.162 0.000 1.000
men, older than 65 0.026 0.070 0.000 0.500
women, older than 65 0.021 0.075 0.000 1.000
children/adult 0.519 0.458 0.000 4.000
age hh head 47.927 15.063 15.000 99.000
education hh head 0.357 1.449 0.000 15.000
hh head man 0.956 0.205 0.000 1.000
household size 7.230 4.684 1.000 39.900
cattle (number) 2.387 6.398 0.000 90.000
sheep (number) 3.377 6.179 0.000 94.000
goat (number) 7.576 10.799 0.000 135.000
Farm equipment 2.155 0.991 0.000 5.000
Other asset (dummy) 0.029 0.169 0.000 1.000
ruralresid 0.271 0.194 0.046 0.771
cityresid 0.212 0.168 0.027 0.880
average rainfall (mm) 445.759 290.277 174.087 1607.861
rainfall deviation (mm) -45.084 78.659 -183.767 175.532
1998
Net transfers 797.842 16243.810 -471993.300 213596.300
Pre-transfer income 59140.700 65510.250 1146.695 704385.800
boys, 6-11 0.125 0.148 0.000 1.000
girls, 6-11 0.121 0.147 0.000 2.000
boys, 12-15 0.044 0.082 0.000 1.000
girls, 12-15 0.041 0.084 0.000 1.000
men, 15-64 0.294 0.163 0.000 1.000
women, 15-64 0.358 0.163 0.000 1.000
men, older than 65 0.029 0.087 0.000 1.000
women, older than 65 0.029 0.100 0.000 1.000
children/adults 0.530 0.477 0.000 5.000
age hh head 48.149 15.050 15.000 99.000
education hh head 0.340 1.485 0.000 15.000
hh head man 0.945 0.228 0.000 1.000
household size 6.517 3.993 1.000 30.500
cattle (number) 3.790 11.073 0.000 250.000
sheep (number) 4.405 7.517 0.000 100.000
goat (number) 10.219 13.965 0.000 280.000
Farm equipment 2.952 1.574 0.000 7.000
Other asset (dummy) 0.366 0.510 0.000 2.000
ruralresid 0.351 0.199 0.000 0.838
cityresid 0.118 0.087 0.000 0.429
average rainfall (mm) 626.232 368.984 164.400 1656.021
rainfall deviation (mm) -41.415 105.615 -288.913 296.50249
Table 14: Summary of variables used in estimations, urban sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
variable mean st. deviation min max
Net transfers -5173.160 25016.400 -182222.200 78117.650
Pre-transfer income 154407.300 156539.500 1026.106 990000.000
boys, 6-11 0.096 0.143 0.000 1.000
girls, 6-11 0.097 0.137 0.000 0.800
boys, 12-15 0.036 0.079 0.000 0.500
girls, 12-15 0.042 0.087 0.000 1.000
men, 15-64 0.393 0.232 0.000 1.000
women, 15-64 0.337 0.188 0.000 1.000
men, older than 65 0.010 0.049 0.000 1.000
women, older than 65 0.013 0.052 0.000 0.500
children/adults 0.451 0.473 0.000 3.000
age hh head 41.369 12.625 15.000 99.000
education hh head 3.305 4.538 0.000 15.000
hh head man 0.903 0.296 0.000 1.000
househol size 6.002 4.012 1.000 44.100
Senior position, formal sector 0.065 0.246 0.000 1.000
Formal sectctor 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000
Skilled worke. 0.079 0.270 0.000 1.000
unskilled worker 0.114 0.318 0.000 1.000
casual worker 0.082 0.274 0.000 1.000
self-employed 0.475 0.499 0.000 1.000
undetermined 0.086 0.280 0.000 1.000
pension recipient 0.190 0.392 0.000 1.000
rent recipient 0.018 0.134 0.000 1.000
refrigerator 0.095 0.294 0.000 1.000
real estate 0.174 0.379 0.000 1.000
motorcycle 0.058 0.233 0.000 1.000
car 0.215 0.411 0.000 1.000
ruralresid 0.136 0.130 0.046 0.771
city 0.165 0.098 0.027 0.417
1998
Net transfers -4386.514 23056.470 -137983.200 73477.110
Pre-transfer income 162575.700 156449.800 1025.262 973998.900
boys, 6-11 0.084 0.140 0.000 1.000
girls, 6-11 0.083 0.140 0.000 1.000
boys, 12-15 0.033 0.077 0.000 0.500
girls, 12-15 0.033 0.078 0.000 0.500
men, 15-64 0.418 0.265 0.000 1.000
women, 15-64 0.346 0.214 0.000 1.000
men, older than 65 0.012 0.061 0.000 1.000
women, older than 65 0.015 0.076 0.000 1.000
children/adults 0.374 0.449 0.000 4.000
age hh head 42.369 13.478 16.000 99.000
education hh head 3.997 4.984 0.000 15.000
hh head man 0.869 0.338 0.000 1.000
household size 4.678 3.138 1.000 24.000
Senior position, formal sector 0.035 0.185 0.000 1.000
Formal sectctor 0.090 0.287 0.000 1.000
Skilled worke. 0.118 0.323 0.000 1.000
unskilled worker 0.096 0.294 0.000 1.000
casual worker 0.075 0.263 0.000 1.000
self-employed 0.480 0.500 0.000 1.000
undetermined 0.106 0.308 0.000 1.000
pension recipient 0.151 0.358 0.000 1.000
rent recipient 0.050 0.218 0.000 1.000
refrigerator 0.120 0.325 0.000 1.000
real estate 0.186 0.389 0.000 1.000
motorcycle 0.480 0.500 0.000 1.000
car 0.064 0.245 0.000 1.000
ruralresid 0.266 0.181 0.076 0.838
city 0.124 0.036 0.038 0.34550
B First stage regression
Table 15: First stage regression, rural sample
(1) (2) (3)
1994 1998 1994/98
Boys 6-11 -18894.600 -17609.800 -14677.100
[2.88]*** [2.41]** [2.98]***
Girls 6-11 -13480.000 -5941.219 -6716.702
[1.96]* [0.81] [1.33]
Boys 12-15 -21474.800 6441.373 97.978
[1.74]* [0.53] [0.01]
Girls 12-15 -12031.900 12773.249 2011.539
[0.98] [1.07] [0.24]
Men 16-64 47285.069 65789.594 64731.250
[3.64]*** [4.80]*** [6.91]***
Women 16-64 4934.144 38153.513 34121.935
[0.38] [2.76]*** [3.61]***
Men 65 + 9424.535 55918.949 43064.457
[0.54] [3.23]*** [3.56]***
Women 65 + -3455.826 30136.525 29666.267
[0.24] [1.79]* [2.70]***
Children/Adult 8695.172 11470.084 12581.050
[1.80]* [2.39]** [3.75]***
Age hh. head -802.597 -1042.002 -814.180
[2.77]*** [3.05]*** [3.64]***
Age hh head sq. 735.093 778.219 636.820
[2.56]** [2.30]** [2.87]***
Education (yrs) 1200.955 141.259 122.920
[2.31]** [1.12] [1.10]
Male head -10202.900 3922.980 -1712.458
[2.38]** [0.83] [0.54]
hh size -1282.283 -4173.902 -2811.822
[6.60]*** [15.00]*** [17.09]***
1998 27916.776
[6.66]***
Cattle 453.970 449.875 512.150
[2.93]*** [5.11]*** [7.39]***
Sheep 243.930 87.073 206.470
[0.98] [0.40] [1.28]
Goat 107.865 216.768 110.743
[0.72] [1.83]* [1.22]
Other assets 5579.938 -5694.647 -2384.872
[1.32] [2.20]** [1.22]
Farm asests 6733.652 11855.845 9047.499
[7.24]*** [12.67]*** [13.62]***
Rainfall deviation 426.055 -122.082 -28.873
[2.47]** [0.80] [0.26]
Rainfall deviation sq. -20.051 27.452 -5.968
[2.27]** [3.79]*** [0.77]51
Millet 4367.568 -9355.549 2309.094
[1.94]* [4.63]*** [1.48]
Maize -1787.499 12602.173 4532.535
[1.05] [6.35]*** [3.19]***
Sorghum -12515.700 -1122.174 -5071.398
[6.10]*** [0.50] [3.18]***
Rice 9686.277 12660.958 16476.746
[4.63]*** [5.61]*** [10.20]***
Cowpea 1767.465 451.147 231.693
[1.00] [0.24] [0.17]
Peanut -411.426 3899.401 1206.435
[0.23] [2.05]** [0.91]
Cotton 22283.318 29680.974 19168.354
[8.46]*** [12.45]*** [10.01]***
Rainfall deviation interacted with
Boys 6-11 -69.262 -18.463 -19.108
[1.01] [0.28] [0.41]
Girls 6-11 -44.609 -8.503 13.117
[0.58] [0.13] [0.27]
Boys 12-15 -261.186 -170.423 -132.829
[1.96]* [1.56] [1.61]
Girls 12-15 -243.603 -71.120 -114.578
[1.86]* [0.65] [1.39]
Men 16-64 -264.341 90.393 4.680
[1.85]* [0.74] [0.05]
Women 16-64 -407.711 14.082 -84.331
[2.86]*** [0.11] [0.92]
Men 65 + -199.456 120.817 66.978
[1.06] [0.81] [0.59]
Women 65 + -411.519 15.234 -66.118
[2.51]** [0.10] [0.62]
Children/Adult -34.100 11.302 6.978
[0.63] [0.26] [0.21]
Age hh. head -3.638 3.956 1.521
[1.17] [1.24] [0.68]
Age hh head sq. 3.211 -2.853 -1.092
[1.03] [0.90] [0.49]
Education (yrs) -0.930 0.831 0.498
[0.18] [0.68] [0.46]
Male head -31.204 24.377 0.238
[0.64] [0.59] [0.01]
hh size 11.917 -8.771 -0.916
[5.09]*** [3.38]*** [0.52]
Cattle -6.878 -0.715 -1.626
[3.77]*** [0.93] [2.50]**
Sheep -3.854 1.600 -0.616
[1.30] [0.72] [0.36]
Goat 0.570 -1.788 -1.199
[0.32] [1.40] [1.20]
Farm assets -42.899 31.481 4.789
[4.26]*** [3.78]*** [0.76]52
Other assets -15.999 -2.361 39.343
[0.33] [0.10] [2.12]**
Millet -97.495 11.838 -15.472
[4.01]*** [0.66] [1.08]
Maize 29.363 1.105 13.260
[1.56] [0.06] [1.01]
Sorghum 10.783 -16.159 -7.486
[0.50] [0.73] [0.48]
Rice 49.368 31.519 42.956
[2.23]** [1.60] [2.87]***
Cowpea 17.395 1.710 -4.519
[0.94] [0.11] [0.37]
Peanut -14.460 2.892 -5.879
[0.76] [0.17] [0.48]
Cotton -131.386 -32.865 -43.727
[4.69]*** [1.49] [2.41]**
Constant 28905.516 36538.757 -7603.468
[1.80]* [2.05]** [0.55]
Observations 4951 5470 10421
R-squared 0.22 0.21 0.26
F test instruments 19.30 25.83 24.96
F test trans income 19.30 25.83 24.96
F test perm. income 18.66 67.66 21.33
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
Regression includes also province dummies for 1998.53
Table 16: First stage regression, urban sample
(1) (2) (3)
1994 1998 1994/98
Boys 6-11 -50597.600 -23309.600 -41510.500
[1.97]** [0.99] [2.37]**
Girls 6-11 -27622.700 -44787.000 -42251.400
[1.03] [1.95]* [2.39]**
Boys 12-15 -47449.900 -66222.100 -60121.300
[1.10] [1.61] [2.00]**
Girls 12-15 -22239.900 -80855.500 -53978.300
[0.56] [2.04]** [1.91]*
Men 16-64 303287.000 217443.000 261814.000
[6.37]*** [4.98]*** [8.08]***
Women 16-64 186590.000 94593.413 138020.000
[3.82]*** [2.12]** [4.16]***
Men 65 + 251598.000 181930.000 215657.000
[3.23]*** [2.86]*** [4.35]***
Women 65 + 195061.000 31914.821 105775.000
[2.72]*** [0.56] [2.40]**
Children/Adult 58569.975 48404.034 53919.953
[3.27]*** [2.80]*** [4.31]***
Age hh. head -2070.476 -2875.873 -2659.177
[1.57] [2.46]** [3.02]***
Age hh head sq. 1085.444 2214.325 1650.950
[0.78] [1.81]* [1.78]*
Education (yrs) 6358.199 859.116 1687.517
[7.31]*** [2.70]*** [5.50]***
Male head -17808.200 -30674.600 -25692.200
[1.73]* [3.46]*** [3.79]***
yeard -51472.100
[0.42]
Refrigerator 53172.633 -7377.562 38115.278
[4.49]*** [0.61] [4.70]***
Real estate 23236.571 -2045.379 12262.875
[3.12]*** [0.30] [2.42]**
Motor cycle 57525.633 34428.358 44573.690
[4.25]*** [5.59]*** [8.19]***
Car 42764.637 117629.000 64241.905
[4.89]*** [8.48]*** [9.49]***
Other Assets 4508.479 -12017.500 -5268.478
[0.46] [1.26] [0.78]
Formal sect. -2050.006 -35544.100 -11982.300
[0.14] [2.22]** [1.15]
Skilled emp. -20203.200 -107086.000 -64511.700
[1.34] [6.57]*** [6.00]***
Unskilled emp. -33945.000 -131081.000 -84776.400
[2.35]** [7.65]*** [7.79]***
Casual worker -64697.000 -126436.000 -99525.400
[4.16]*** [7.10]*** [8.63]***54
Independent -35852.900 -132322.000 -88113.300
[2.72]*** [8.42]*** [8.95]***
Undetermined -67548.200 -162932.000 -115850.000
[4.32]*** [9.38]*** [10.18]***
Pension recipient 6023.627 8633.044 5287.155
[0.82] [1.11] [1.00]
Rent recipient 6060.064 21226.900 11613.836
[0.30] [1.78]* [1.12]
Constant 40123.955 230770.000 161222.000
[0.55] [3.82]*** [3.44]***
Observations 2143 2278 4421
R-squared 0.39 0.45 0.40
F test instruments 12.01 34.23 42.00
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
Regression includes also province dummies.